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I. INTRODUCTION
The insurance defense lawyer sternly looks into the gaze of the
inexperienced claimant who is seeking uninsured motorist (UM) coverage as
the mandatory arbitration proceeds.
Defense Lawyer: Claimant, according to the skid marks analysis
conducted by experts at the University, you were driving in excess of the
speed limit as you changed lanes and collided with the uninsured driver.Claimant: I was driving at the posted speed when the uninsured driver
changed into the same lane I was going into, collided with me, and caused
my injuries.
The defense lawyer, with a sigh of disbelief, focuses his eyes on the
overflowing manila folder detailing the pertinent matters of the case. Silence
permeates the room as the lawyer reviews the evidentiary material, flipping
through pages of documents without posing any follow-up question. The
tension builds as all of the arbitral actors, especially the claimant, await the
defense lawyer's next action.
Claimant's Lawyer: I object to Defense Counsel not presenting a
question. This silence is unfairly prejudicial to my client. If Counsel has
questions, he should ask them rather than play these games.
Arbitrator: Overruled, Counsel. This is arbitration, not a trial held in
court. Defense Counsel, you may proceed.
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luck. I would also like to thank all my family and friends back home in California for
their constant support throughout the whole "Note Writing" process. The possibility of
your rights being compromised while arbitrating an insurance claim was a motivating
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Close to a minute has passed since the claimant finished his response, yet
the defense lawyer continues to sift through the thick case file without posing
a question.
Claimant: Well, I might have been going a bit over the speed limit, but
this did not make me reckless in any way. I was changing lanes routinely. I
mean, maybe I should have checked my blind spot before moving into the
lane, but the speed definitely did not cause the accident. It was the uninsured
driver who should not have been drinking and driving.
The defense lawyer quickly drops his papers and proceeds to jump on the
inconsistency he created in the claimant's testimony.
Defense Lawyer: Oh, so you did not check your blind spot before
changing lanes. Would you agree that your failure to check your blind spot
contributed to the accident?
Claimant: I should have checked my blind spot, but the uninsured driver
was more at fault than I was because he was driving drunk.
Defense Lawyer: Thank you, no further questions.1
The preceding episode took place during a UM arbitration between the
insured claimant who sought coverage and the insurance defense lawyer who
utilized techniques to minimize the company's liability to its insured. Based
on this proceeding, the claimant is not likely to obtain an arbitral award up to
the policy limits because he disclosed to the arbitrator his possible role in
causing the accident.2
1 This simulation of a mandatory UM arbitration and the characters identified are
completely fictitious. However, the subject matter, the conduct of the professional arbitral
actors (the lawyers and arbitrators), and the reaction of the claimant closely approximate
arbitrations this author attended as a summer law clerk for a nationally-recognized
insurance company.
2 See discussion infra Part ll.D.
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UM coverage is intended to compensate insured, or covered, individuals 3
whose injuries arise from unidentified drivers 4 or drivers who have
inadequate liability insurance coverage to pay for the damages.5 National
estimates indicate that between 5% and 25% of motorists do not carry any
form of automobile insurance. 6 Currently, almost all states require insurance
companies that sell automobile insurance policies to offer UM coverage to
3 ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED & UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 4.1 (2d ed.
2000). The term "insured" or "covered person" is commonly defined in the insurance
policy describing which individuals are entitled to the coverage that the insurance
company is obligated to afford. An insured is typically described in the policy as
individuals identified in the declarations, their relatives or family members who occupy a
covered or insured vehicle, and those persons who sustain damages because of an injury
to the insured. Id.
Professor Widiss is considered to be the authority on UM insurance and this is
substantiated by the number of times he has been cited in both judicial opinions and law
review articles. A "terms and connectors" search on Westlaw of "Widiss" in the same
sentence as "uninsured" and "motorist" (widiss /s uninsured & motorist) revealed that
574 judicial opinions from federal and state courts cited to Professor Widiss. This same
search resulted in eighty-three legal periodicals citing to Professor Widiss. As a result,
this Note will rely on Professor Widiss in many instances to clarify the cloudy world of
UM insurance.
4 1 WIDISS, supra note 3, at 564. This term refers to where there is physical contact
with a hit-and-run vehicle and where the identity of the owner or operator of the hit-and-
run vehicle cannot be ascertained. Id.
5 Michael J. Hanagan, If you Lose, it is Binding, but if you Win-They Get a New
Trial: Illinois Uninsured Motorist Arbitration, 2005 J. DIsP. RESOL. 93, 93 (2005)
(arguing that the Illinois UM statute likely violates the federal and state constitutions for
only allowing the insurance company to take a dispute to court and not the injured
claimant seeking compensation). In order to clarify a typical UM situation, here is an
example: X gets into an accident with Y. X is insured with a large insurance company
and has UM coverage with a policy limit of $50,000 per person or per accident. X has
medical bills arising from the accident valued approximately at $50,000. Y, the at-fault
driver, has liability insurance coverage with per person or per accident policy limit of
$20,000. Thus, the value of X's claim will exceed Y's liability coverage, forcing X to
seek UM benefits from X's own insurer (at least in regards to the balance that the
uninsured driver is unable to pay).
6 Mark A. Saltzman, Recent Development, Reed v. Farmers Insurance Group, 15
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 895, 895 (2000). As a result, if an insured driver is injured in
an accident with one of these numerous individuals who are without any liability
insurance, then the insured driver cannot recover damages from the at-fault uninsured
individual. See id. Rather, the insured claimants must resort to seeking coverage directly
from their own automobile insurance provider. See id.
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combat the threat of being injured by an uninsured individual. 7 Many
insurance customers have purchased UM coverage because numerous states
passed laws that "require or strongly encourage" insurance companies to
provide their insureds with such protection. 8 Accordingly, individuals who
seek to enforce the protection of UM coverage must make a claim with their
insurance provider, often times resulting in disputes over whether the policy
covers the situation.9
Insurance companies prefer to resolve UM coverage disputes through
arbitration rather than through litigation for several reasons. First, arbitrating
a dispute results in a faster resolution than can be obtained through the court
system. 10 Second, arbitration is less expensive than a court proceeding
because of its expeditious manner in settling disputes, and because it avoids
jury awards that tend to favor injured claimants over large insurance
companies." For these reasons, UM providers include in their policies a
provision that mandates UM coverage dispute resolution through binding
arbitration. 12 Because claimants are forced out of the court system and into
arbitration through a "take-it-or-leave-it" contract, the process to recover UM
benefits within a structure that the insurance companies create is unfair to
claimants.13
Because arbitration does not provide the same procedural safeguards as a
judicial proceeding, 14 a claimants' right to procedural due process is
7 Hanagan, supra note 5, at 93. Another author described this recent trend as state
law that "requires or encourages" insurance companies to provide UM coverage to its
insured buying an automobile insurance policy. Gary T. Schwartz, A Proposal for Tort
Reform: Reformulating Uninsured Motorist Plans, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 419, 423 (1987)
(noting that even in the states that only strongly encourage insurance companies to
provide UM coverage, UM coverage is still widely purchased).
8 Schwartz, supra note 7, at 423 (stating that in North Carolina, Nebraska, and Los
Angeles County over ninety percent of drivers purchase UM coverage).
9 See infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
10 Steven A. Meyerowitz, The Arbitration Alternative, 71 A.B.A. J. 78, 80 (1985)
(arguing that the speed of obtaining a resolution is one of the most important benefits of
arbitration, especially when compared to the many months that litigating a dispute in
court normally takes).
11 See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
12 See discussion infra Part II.C. The referenced section of the Note articulates
specific characteristics of arbitration that are beneficial to institutional parties, like
insurance companies. As a result of the benefits, insurance companies secure mandatory
arbitration of disputes through pre-dispute clauses.
13 See infra note 27-29 and accompanying text.
14 See discussion infra Part IV.B-C. The referenced sections details how arbitrators,
managing the arbitration based on unlimited discretion and the limited avenue for judicial
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threatened when they attempt to enforce UM benefits. One common example
that exposes the procedural unfairness found in the UM arbitration context is
"dead air silence."'15 Technically, dead air silence is the time elapsed between
the end of a claimant's response to a certain question and the insurance
defense lawyer's presentation of the next question. 16
The use of dead air silence during UM arbitrations is just one example of
the flaws present in the dispute resolution system that the insurance
companies designed. In reality, the compelled arbitration system favors
repeat institutional players, such as insurance companies, over inexperienced
claimants who are unaware of the arbitral forum.17 By agreeing to purchase
UM coverage, insureds are forced to waive their right to procedural due
process and instead present the dispute before an arbitrator rather than a jury.
Under the current UM arbitration system, the combination of arbitrators'
unlimited discretion in managing hearings, their persuasive business interest
in future appointments, and their ability to produce an arbitral award that
practically reflects the final resolution of the dispute precipitates the use of
insurer-friendly techniques, such as dead air silence. Furthermore, because
insured claimants are forced into arbitration through an adhesive insurance
policy clause, the result is an effective displacement of in-court adjudication
which makes it impossible to avoid resolving UM disputes through a process
that is unilaterally designed by the insurer. As a result, the current dispute
resolution system designed to handle UM coverage claims is inherently
unfair and needs to be altered so that deserving claimants can receive their
fair proportion of justice, and so that the public can confidently resort to the
arbitration system.
review, eliminate many of the procedural safeguards associated with a judicial
proceeding.
15 See discussion infra Part II.D. Dead air silence, which was demonstrated in the
opening portion of the Note, is a common strategy used by insurance defense lawyers
during arbitrations in which claimants seeks to recover UM benefits from their insurers.
The author has learned of this technique through UM arbitrations he attended as a
summer clerk for an insurance company. The name of the company and the identity of
the attorneys he worked for will remain anonymous throughout the Note.
16 This is the author's own definition for the dead air silence technique that
insurance defense lawyers utilize in forcing the insured claimant to appear less credible
or even partially blameworthy for the accident. Practitioners are likely to refer to this
phenomenon in different terms, but most lawyers working for an insurance company that
provides UM coverage understand what perpetual silence during an arbitration can do to
an inexperienced claimant unaware of the technique.
17 See infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
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Part II of this Note will discuss the nature of UM coverage, common
policy terms, and triggers that lead claimants into mandatory binding
arbitration to resolve their disputes. It will also outline ethical issues that
lawyers and arbitrators face in the UM context when conducting arbitrations.
Part III describes constitutional rights afforded to individuals, including
procedural safeguards implemented when a property interest is threatened to
be taken away, equal protection of the laws among similarly situated people,
and the right to present common law claims of negligence and damages
before a jury. Part IV discusses specific characteristics of the UM arbitration
system and how it deprives insured claimants of the constitutional rights
outlined in the preceding section. Part V lists the realistic barriers that may
prevent UM arbitrations from improving the procedural safeguards and rights
of insured claimants. With the current framework of UM arbitrations detailed
and the technical constraints acting as obstacles to significantly improving
rights of claimants explained, Part VI prescribes adopting a due process
protocol specifically governing UM arbitrations as a first step to solving the
deficiencies of the insurer-created dispute resolution system.
II. THE NATURE OF UM COVERAGE AND THE ARBITRATION SYSTEM
USED TO RESOLVE DISPUTES
This section explores (1) the manner in which insured claimants are
forced into the arbitral forum, (2) general characteristics of arbitration, (3)
why insurance companies contractually guarantee the mandatory resort to
arbitration, (4) how dead air silence operates within this insurer-designed
system, and (5) how the current framework of UM arbitration causes
professional arbitral actors to violate accepted rules of ethics. Because dead
air silence can exist in the UM arbitration structure, the adverse effects on
insured claimants combined with lawyers and arbitrators violating ethical
obligations necessitates a change to the dispute resolution system.
A. Specific Aspects of UM Coverage
UM coverage is the protection insured drivers receive from their
insurance companies when injured in an accident with a driver who is
unidentified or possesses inadequate insurance to cover the damages. 18 When
18 See, Hanagan supra note 5, at 93. The UM policy provisions make the insurer
liable only conditioned upon the showing of negligence of a third party who is uninsured.
2 WIDISS, supra note 3, at 301. As a result, the insurer is only liable to the insured
claimant in the event damages are shown to arise from the negligence of an uninsured
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the insured claimant seeks to enforce the UM policy terms, the individual is
attempting to obtain recovery from the insurance company itself rather than
from the at-fault driver who caused the damages to the insured claimant. 19
Naturally, the insurance company will seek ways to avoid or minimize
paying the UM benefits to its insured.20 As a result, an unavoidable conflict
exists in the UM context wherein the insured tries to obtain compensation for
the injuries and the insurance company tries to avoid paying for the losses.21
Within the UM policy, insurance companies include a clause to settle
future disputes over UM benefits through mandatory binding arbitration
between the insured claimant and the insurer.22 Therefore, once the insured
purchases UM coverage, the individual agrees in advance to resolve all
disputes over UM benefits through binding arbitration. 23 Based on this
scenario, it appears the insured waives the right to bring any disputes over
UM coverage to court. 24 The typical agreement to arbitrate usually states that
if the insured and insurer cannot agree as to whether the claimant is "legally
entitled" to recover damages or as to the amount of damages, then the
motorist driver. Id. Thus, if the insured claimant cannot establish fault of an uninsured
third party, the insurer may not be legally obligated to provide coverage. See id. For
example, language used in the UM policy specifies that the "[insurance] company will
pay all sums which the insured... shall be legally entitled to recover as
damages.., because of bodily injury sustained by the insured, caused by [the use of an]
uninsured highway vehicle." Schwartz, supra note 7, at 424-25 (footnote omitted).
19 Hanagan, supra note 5, at 93.
20 Id. at 99. This means that the insurance company will use techniques or interpret
policy language in a manner that will limit the company's liability to its insured. See id.
Although an insurance company is under a contract to extend the policy limits to a
situation, the company will use all necessary measures to demonstrate that the particular
situation is beyond the UM policy, and thereby is not covered. See id
21 Id.
22 THE AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, INSURANCE ADR MANUAL 104 (1993). The
institutional author refers to these arbitration provisions as "future dispute resolution
clauses." Id. Basically, the author claims that the parties contractually agree in advance to
resolve disputes over receiving UM coverage through arbitration rather than resorting to
courts. See id. Thus, an insured claimant is forced into arbitrating UM coverage disputes
based on the policy language mandating arbitration. See id.
23 See id.
24 See 2 WIDiss, supra note 3, at 320-25. These agreements to arbitrate future
disputes do not seem voluntary on the part of the insured, but rather a provision that must
be accepted if the insured desires the protection from uninsured or unidentified drivers.
See id. As a result, in order for the insured to receive UM coverage from the insurer, he
or she must adhere to the arbitration provision regardless of whether the insured
voluntarily elects to arbitrate a future dispute. See id.
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disputed matter is to be resolved by arbitration.25 Once the arbitration takes
place and the arbitrator renders the award, a judicial proceeding is required to
enforce the award.26
The main criticism against these "future dispute resolution clauses" is
that they appear to create an adhesion contract wherein the insured accepts
the arbitration provision on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. 27 In order to be
protected from uninsured drivers, the insured must adhere to the arbitration-
of-future-disputes provision, which effectively compromises a voluntary
agreement to arbitrate.2 8 Because the insured is not truly choosing the arbitral
forum, the bargaining power heavily favors the insurer to create an
advantageous dispute resolution system for the insurer and impose that
system on the insured claimant. 2 9
25 THE AM. ARBrrRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 206 (describing the usual
language that insurance companies place in the policy as an agreement to resolve future
disputes through mandatory binding arbitration). Another example of an agreement to
arbitrate is:
If the insured (or the insured's legal representative) and the insurance company do
not agree on (a) whether a claimant is legally entitled to recover damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle or (b) on the amount of such
damages, the disputed matter is to be resolved by arbitration.
2 WIDISS, supra note 3, at 297 (emphasis added). The phrase "is to be" explicitly
mandates that all disputes are to be resolved through an arbitration system, leaving no
other alternative to obtain disputed UM benefits. See id.
26 2 WiDiss, supra note 3, at 481.
27 See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WiS. L. REV. 33,
55 (1997). The article defines an adhesion contract as a (1) standardized form document,
(2) drafted by one party which (3) participates in numerous similar transactions and (4)
presents the form to the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, (5) the adhering party enters
into few of the transactions in question, and (6) the adhering party signs the form. Id.
This definition seems to fit the UM future dispute resolution provisions where the insured
must accept to arbitrate disputes if the insured is to have the protection of UM coverage.
See id.
28 See id. Professor Schwartz states that if the arbitration provision is on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis, then the individual does not voluntarily agree to arbitrate disputes. See id.
at 69. In fact, the individual is forced to resort to this dispute resolution system if he or
she is to obtain UM coverage. See id,
29 2 WIDISS, supra note 3, at 321 (stating that the insured has no real bargaining
power to specify the terms or provisions of the policy, which includes the mandatory
arbitration clause); Schwartz, supra note 27, at 69 (arguing that the insured claimant and
the insurer have disparate bargaining power because the insurer, which is the drafting
party, can impose the arbitration clause on a take-it-or-leave-it basis); Russell D.
Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 284
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Insurance companies utilize mandatory binding arbitration in their UM
policies precisely because of the disparities it creates between the parties and
the numerous advantages that the arbitral forum provides for the institutional
"repeat player." 30 However, compelling arbitration of disputes in the UM
context presents many problems. First, the insured claimant seems to be
forced into arbitration without voluntarily consenting to settle the issue
outside of court.31 Second, the mandatory nature of arbitration eliminates the
procedural safeguards that are found in court, such as the right to appeal a
decision, successfully object to improper questions, or challenge the verdict
before a final judgment.32 Finally, compelled arbitration has been described
as "unfair" and "tainted" because the insurer designs the arbitration system to
its advantage and inflicts it upon the insured without any alternatives.33
B. The General Characteristics ofArbitration
Arbitration is considered an alternate adjudicative process where a
designated neutral person, or a panel of neutral persons, conducts hearings
and considers evidence to resolve the matter in dispute.34 The decision is
rendered in the form of an award after all of the testimony and evidence
relevant to the controversy is considered. 35 This award is likely to be binding
(2002) (contending that mandatory binding arbitration clauses must be changed because
the bargaining powers are unequal between the adherent and the drafter).
30 Alan S. Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 485, 524 (1997).
Insurance companies are considered institutional repeat players because they frequently
appear in arbitrations against their insured. See id. at 524-25. This term is meant to
convey a relative component. Relative to insured claimants, who likely will only appear
in a handful of arbitrations, insurance companies are considered the repeat players. As a
result of this accumulated expertise and experience, insurers are more knowledgeable
about the arbitration system as opposed to the insured.
31 2 WiDIss, supra note 3, at 323.
32 See discussion infra Part IV.B-C.
33 Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1631, 1671 (arguing that mandatory arbitration is unfair, but even if fair, the process is
tainted to force another party to forgo the traditional form of dispute resolution, which
society ordains as litigation).
34 Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural and Evidentiary Norms
Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1290-96 (1998)
(discussing how arbitration is really a "lite" version of traditional litigation similar to how
"lite" food products are just smaller versions of the original food product). Extending this
analogy, arbitration would be the equivalent of Diet Coke for having substantially the
same elements of a court proceeding but without all the unwanted calories.
35 Id at 1296.
535
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
upon the parties if the decision to arbitrate was invoked on a mandatory
basis, usually pursuant to a contractual agreement to arbitrate. 36 Under this
characterization, a UM arbitral award would be binding because of the policy
provision mandating arbitration of future disputes regarding the allocation of
UM benefits. 37
Following its recent growth, arbitration has been commonly described as
a speedy, efficient, and advantageous method of dispute resolution.38 By
requiring the future resolution of UM disputes through arbitration, the
insured and insurer can obtain a resolution to the dispute within weeks or
months after making the request for arbitration.39 This speedy characteristic
of arbitration is attributed to the flexibility afforded to arbitrators in
managing the hearing regardless of whether the procedures conform to legal
principles.40 Despite arbitrators' full discretion to administer the arbitration
process, they are constrained by the requirement of being fair to both
parties.41
Before an arbitration award becomes effective, a court must enforce,
modify, or vacate the award.42 Therefore, a judicial proceeding is necessary
in order for an arbitration award to become final and binding upon the
parties.43 Enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)44 and the Uniform
Arbitration Act (UAA) 45 has resulted in fewer awards being vacated at the
judicial proceeding stage. 46 Under the FAA, courts are required to enforce
36 See id.
37 See id.
38 2 Wmiss, supra note 3, at 515; David E. Robbins, Calling All Arbitrators:
Reclaim Control of the Arbitration Process-The Courts Let You, 60 DisP. RESOL. J.,
Feb-Apr. 2005, at 9 (arguing that arbitrators' awards will rarely be overturned and
therefore arbitrators should manage the process without fear of having their awards
vacated).
39 2 WIDISS, supra note 3, at 518.
4 0 See id. at 519.
41 THE AM. ARBrrRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 5.
42 See 2 WiDiss, supra note 3, at 481. According to the author, affirming or vacating
an arbitration award necessarily requires a judicial proceeding. Id. With arbitrators
effectively acting as the final judge of applying law to facts, the award will not be
vacated just because the arbitrator made a mistake or even several mistakes. Id.
43 Id.
44 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
45 UNiF. ARBITRATiON ACT § 1, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1955).
46 See Robbins, supra note 38, at 10-11 (describing how the FAA and the UAA
establishes difficult standards to vacate an arbitral award during the judicial proceeding,
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arbitration clauses that affect commerce as if the private agreements are like
any other contract. 47 Additionally, the UAA, which has been adopted by
thirty-five states, also makes private arbitration agreements valid.48 Even
though the UAA does not eliminate the jurisdiction of state and federal
courts, the courts must adhere to a certain "hands-off' period during which
they cannot interfere with the arbitration.49 As a result of the FAA and UAA,
there is a national policy to enforce arbitration agreements and the awards
arbitration produces. 50 Therefore, UM arbitration awards are highly likely to
be upheld by the judiciary because of the national policy favoring arbitration
of disputes.5'
There are several characteristics unique to arbitration when it is
compared to the traditional form of litigation. First, courts tend to follow well
established rigid rules about discovery and evidence. 52 In contrast, arbitration
is far more flexible, giving the arbitrator full discretion to determine the
and therefore creates a general public policy in favor of enforcing the arbitrator's
decision).
47 This section of the FAA provides:
A written provision.., or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
48 The relevant provision of the UAA, similar to the FAA, provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter
arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
7 U.L.A. at 6-7.
49 Henderson v. Herman, 409 S.E.2d 739, 741-42 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that once a court compels arbitration it undergoes a "hands-off' period where the court
does not lose jurisdiction but then also cannot interfere with the arbitration proceeding).
50 See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 81 (describing how the limited grounds on which
arbitration clauses can be challenged under the FAA and UAA has created a national
policy favoring arbitration).
51 See id.
52 THE AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 57 (noting how judges are
required to follow rules of procedure and evidence whereas arbitrators have unlimited
flexibility to manage the arbitration process based on the needs of the parties).
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manner in which the arbitration will proceed.53 Second, arbitration devotes
less time to discovery and offers a limited opportunity for appeal. 54 Finally,
arbitration can set the floor and ceiling within which an award must fall, but
a court of law cannot determine the judgment prior to the litigation. 55
In addition to the aforementioned differences between arbitration and the
judicial system, arbitrators and judges are also very different from each other
in several ways. 56 First, arbitrators are usually selected by the parties to the
dispute, while judges are either appointed by a governing body or elected by
designated constituents. 57 Second, arbitrators are selected for a particular
dispute, resulting in a lack of procedural continuity that is implicit in the
judicial process. 58 A third distinction is that judges maintain a level of
impartiality from the parties, while arbitrators might be closely connected to
the particular industry and the parties themselves. 59 Finally, arbitrators,
unlike judges, are largely unregulated by overarching legal principles and are
not monitored by any sort of institution.60
For these reasons, insured claimants seeking UM benefits enter a
completely different adjudicative forum than the traditional judicial process,
and their rights are determined by a decisionmaker completely distinct from a
judge. 61 As a result, the insured claimant loses many of the procedural
safeguards afforded in the court system in the insurer-designed arbitration
system. Most importantly, it is highly probable that insured claimants do not
fully understand the difference between the two adjudicative forums or that
arbitration provides the only avenue to resolve UM disputes. 62
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Henry Gabriel & Anjanette H. Raymond, Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators:
Basic Principles and Emerging Standards, 5 WYO. L. REv. 453,454-55 (2005) (showing
that arbitrators are not judges based on the inherent differences between the two actors;
therefore, arbitrators need not follow the same ethical principles judges are obligated to
maintain).
57 Id. at 454.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 454-55.
60 Id. at 456.
61 See id at 454-56.
62 2 WiDIss, supra note 3, at 322-23 (describing how the UM arbitration provision is
placed outside an individual's range of focus, which likely makes the individual unaware
of the arbitration requirement until a dispute develops).
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C. Why Insurance Companies Prefer Arbitration for Adjudicating
Disputes over UM Coverage
Insurance companies have a long history of resorting to arbitration to
settle UM disputes, making arbitration the predominant method for insured
drivers to receive UM benefits from their insurer.63 This arbitration
preference used to resolve disputes arising from the UM policy is best
explained by the advantages that insurance companies receive from
arbitration.
As a result of arbitrating all of the disputes arising from the UM policy,
insurance companies lower their costs by limiting the extension of UM
benefits while reducing the delays associated with litigation.64 Thus, the
lower systemic costs of arbitration and its quick resolution of disputes attract
large industries, like the insurance industry, to choose arbitration over
litigation.65
Another reason insurance companies choose arbitration to settle disputes
over UM coverage is to avoid public jury trials.66 Arbitration exchanges the
jury that represents the respective community for individuals who are
accustomed to the specific business or industry.67 As a result, insurance
companies hope that arbitrators will render what they consider to be
63 Id. at 69, 103; Saltzman, supra note 6, at 896 (arguing that the modem trend of
arbitrating all disputes arising from the UM policy has not only displaced the judiciary,
but that the mandatory arbitration clause has also created a new source of controversy
between the insured and the insurer).
64 See THE AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 56; Alexander J.S. Colvin,
From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration and the Reconfiguration of
Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 581, 585 (2004) (stating
that the risk perspective of delays and increased costs associated with litigation is
eliminated when corporate defendants adjudicate all disputes through mandatory binding
arbitration). The reduction in costs comes with the flexible approach in arbitration that
does not follow the rigid rules of the judicial system. See Colvin, supra note 64, at 585.
As a result, attorney fees will be less, filing costs will be less, and costs associated with
discovery and pre-trial motions will be significantly less. See id. In addition, because
arbitration reaches a disposition quicker than litigation in courts, the insurance company
will only be disabled for a short period of time. See id. This means the distraction and the
long-lasting characteristics of public trials are avoided by insurance companies.
65 See Colvin, supra note 64, at 585.
66 Id.
67 See id.
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reasonable arbitral awards that are within the policy limits, 68 thereby
lowering the costs for insurance companies.69 Because some juries view
insurance companies as "deep pocket" defendants, arbitration avoids the risk
of large jury verdicts which reward individuals and are against what is
perceived to be the rich insurance industry.70 Moreover, data comparing jury
and arbitral awards reveals that both the mean and median value of awards
are lower for arbitration.7 1 Thus, insurance companies prefer resolving UM
disputes through arbitration to avoid public juries and reduce their legal
exposure to insured claimants seeking UM benefits.
72
There are numerous other reasons that drive insurance companies to
mandate arbitration for determining whether UM coverage exists. Because
arbitration is unlikely to produce a large award for the insured, the prevailing
plaintiff's attorney fees, which the insurer pays pursuant to statutes, will be
less, thereby reducing the insurance companies' potential expense.
73
Additionally, arbitrations are private proceedings.74 As a result, public
perception does not damage the reputation of insurance companies because
arbitration eliminates the public's involvement in arbitral proceedings. 75
Finally, the limited role of discovery skews the arbitration system in favor of
the insurance company because the claimant has the burden of producing
68 2 WIDiss, supra note 3, at 522 (stating that arbitrators from the field in which the
dispute exists are more likely to render a reasonable award within the policy limits than a
jury that has no expertise in the area).
69 See infra text accompanying notes 71-74.
70 Hanagan, supra note 5, at 99 (stating that juries commonly view insurers as
companies with "deep pockets" that can afford to pay individuals seeking relief whether
or not the individual is really entitled to recover insurance proceeds). Because insurance
companies are thought to have plentiful financial resources, juries attach less sympathy to
insurance companies relative to the injured claimants. See id. Thus, injured claimants
typically end up as the victor in public jury trials. See id.
71 Schwartz, supra note 27, at 65. The study described the median arbitration award
as $49,400, versus the median jury verdict of $264,700. Id. In addition, the mean
arbitration award was also lower at $124,500, versus the mean jury verdict of $703,600.
Id. Although the data reflects just a sample, it does reveal a general trend that arbitral
awards are significantly less than jury verdicts. As a result, insurance companies prefer
resorting to arbitration as a method to reduce their costs in the numerous claims filed
against them.
72 See id.; Hanagan, supra note 5, at 99.
73 Schwartz, supra note 27, at 60.
74 Id. at 61. This means that papers filed with arbitrators are not part of the public
record, proceedings do not take place in public courtrooms, and the subject matter of UM
arbitrations are not publicized because it seems to be less interesting to the media. Id.
75 Id.
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evidence that is likely in the possession of the insurer.76 These three reasons,
which include lower plaintiff attorney fees, lack of public exposure, and
limited discovery, lead insurance companies to choose arbitration to resolve
disputes arising from UM policies.
Based on the aforementioned attributes, it is logical for insurance
companies to lock in the advantages of arbitration in advance of any disputes
through mandatory arbitration clauses in the UM policy. Because of the
consistent advantages of arbitration for the insurance companies and the
adhesive nature of the clause, it is unlikely that the insured claimant can
avoid the arbitral forum to resolve disputes over UM coverage. Thus, moving
towards an arbitration system that provides greater fairness to the small
players, such as the insured individual, can enhance the reputation of
arbitration and increase public confidence in the arbitration dispute resolution
system.
D. The Dead Air Silence Phenomenon in UMArbitration
Dead air silence occurs in the time that elapses between when claimants
finish their response to a question and when the insurance defense lawyer
presents a subsequent question.77 After insured claimants finish a response to
a question, the defense lawyer silently waits while looking through
evidentiary materials before presenting a follow-up question. As the
prolonged silence continues, the tension builds,78 likely causing claimants or
witnesses to elaborate on their previous response. 79 Unfortunately, such
76 Id.
77 This definition is the author's characterization of the technique that insurance
defense lawyers utilize to obtain favorable pecuniary results for the lawyer's respective
insurance company. Regardless of how one conceptualizes the technique, the main object
is to use silence in an arbitration proceeding to intimidate the claimant and make the
claimant feel uncomfortable about the response previously given.
78 One of the author's supervising attorneys informed him that the silence causes a
tension, which results in the insured not feeling credible in the eyes of the insurance
defense lawyer and finding the need to talk more to obtain a greater degree of credibility.
79 Based on this author's understanding, the inexperienced claimant feels a need to
eliminate the tension that silence presents by elaborating on the previous answer.
According to an insurance defense lawyer, the extensive period of silence most likely
makes the claimant feel like the previous response was inadequate or untrustworthy and
forces the claimant to try to clarify the matter. As the claimant provides more details
about the accident, inconsistencies as to the facts (how fast the insured driver was going,
what actions the insured driver took, the weather conditions, the actions of the uninsured
driver) can occur. It is this inconsistency in the testimony that the insurance defense
lawyer aims to illustrate to the arbitrator. Because the arbitrator places appropriate weight
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continued responses often present inconsistencies in the testimony.80 Because
the arbitrator has the authority to weigh the significance of each evidentiary
item, a claimant's testimony that is incoherent or inconsistent due to
unnecessary elaboration will appear less credible and thereby adversely
affect the arbitral award.81
The claimant's lawyer can object to the use of dead air silence, but the
arbitrator will usually allow the testimony to continue over the objection of
the party opposing the line of questioning.8 2 Accordingly, even with the
claimant's counsel's objection to every passing second of silence, any such
objection is highly unlikely to terminate the dead air and cure the
increasingly tense environment.8 3 In addition to the fact that objections are
rarely sustained, the arbitrator's future business interest also exacerbates the
situation in allowing this commonly-used insurance defense tactic.8 4 The
arbitrator has an interest in being appointed again for any future arbitration.8 5
With the insurance company representing the repeat player in the situation,
the decisions that the arbitrator makes are likely to favor the institutional
on evidence, a testimony that is incoherent will be apprised less weight by the arbitrator
and will undoubtedly affect the binding arbitration award. See 2 WIDIss, supra note 3, at
458.
80 Id.
81 Id at 456-57. Arbitrators are entitled to give appropriate weight to evidence after
hearing all objections. Id. This shows how dead air silence can adversely affect the
insured's arbitral award for producing an inconsistent testimony not worthy of much
weight. See id.
82 Id at 458. This common phenomenon of not sustaining objections occurs because
the arbitrator needs to hear and perceive everything that will help him or her decide the
case properly. Id. As a result, many objections will not be sustained and the testimony
will be permitted to continue despite the opposing counsel's displeasure. See id. Because
arbitrators do not require the same level of protection as juries, they will allow
testimonies to continue over clearly audible objections. See id.
83 For example, in one of the arbitrations this author attended, the claimant's counsel
continuously objected to the insurance defense attorney's use of dead air silence.
However, the arbitrator repeatedly mentioned that this was arbitration, not subject to the
same rules found in court. The claimant continued her response to the previous question
and created an inconsistency in the injuries received. As a result, the claimant received
only half of her medical expenses incurred, which represented about 30% of the policy
limits.
84 Rau, supra note 30, at 521-23 (arguing that the structural bias present in the UM
arbitration system where arbitrators are trying to obtain future business opportunities
from the institutional repeat player is a major criticism of such a dispute resolution
system).
85 Id.
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party.86 Thus, the arbitrator's future business interest will also have an
impact on permitting the dead air silence to continue despite its serious
disadvantages for the claimant.8 7 Most importantly, the arbitral award is
final, with narrow exceptions for judicial review.88 Therefore, claimants who
receive a lower award because they were victims of dead air silence cannot
appeal to a state or federal court to vacate the arbitral award.89 Because
arbitral awards are not subject to expansive judicial review and objections are
rarely sustained,90 the arbitrator may exercise bias that favors insurance
companies, which makes dead air silence a substantial threat to an
individual's right to procedural due process in enforcing UM policies.91
E. Ethical Boundaries in Arbitration Dealing With UM Coverage
Issues
In general, the ethical obligations of all arbitral actors, including
arbitrators, in-house insurance defense lawyers, and counsel representing the
insured, are comparable to the rules of ethics governing courts.92 The ethical
principles to which arbitral actors should adhere include acting honestly,
professionally, and with integrity in every aspect of the arbitration.93
Additionally, lawyers and arbitrators are under an obligation to "uphold the
integrity and fairness of the arbitration process. ' '94
86 Id. at 524-25.
87 See id. at 521-25.
88 THE AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, supra note 22, at 5.
89 See id.
90 Id.
91 See Rau, supra note 30, at 521-25.
92 See Gabriel & Raymond, supra note 56, at 455. Although the traditional rules of
ethics act as a model, strict adherence by arbitral actors is not necessary because
arbitration is not the equivalent of a proceeding undertaken in a court of law. Id.
Additionally, arbitrators are completely distinct from judges and need not follow the
same ethical principles by which judicial actors are bound. Id.
93 O.S.B.A. C.L.E. REFERENCE MANUAL VOLUME No. 04-10, INSURANCE
DEFENSE-ETHICS AND BEST PRACTICES § 2.12 (2004). This source is a continuing legal
education pamphlet on the ethical concerns surrounding insurance defense lawyers and
insurance companies in their conduct during arbitrations and other forms of dispute
resolution.
94 Gabriel & Raymond, supra note 56, at 458; see, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N
CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2002), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21958. The relevant provision provides:
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Applying these general rules, UM arbitration proceedings and the use of
dead air silence may be considered ethical violations on the part of insurance
defense lawyers in that they are not acting with integrity.95 Additionally, by
permitting the continued use of dead air silence over the objection of the
claimant's counsel, the arbitrator fails to uphold the "integrity and fairness of
the [arbitration] process." 96 Given such ethical infractions, insured claimants
would be hesitant to resolve their UM coverage disputes in an arbitral forum.
Because the use of mandatory binding arbitration clauses in the UM policy
makes arbitration unavoidable, the dispute resolution system itself must be
changed.
Analysis of the specific ethical obligations of the insurer, insurance
defense lawyers, and arbitrators during UM arbitration, reveals that using
dead air silence against an insured causes numerous ethical violations. If the
public is to have confidence in resorting to arbitration as an effective dispute
resolution system, then the insurer-designed structure needs to change so that
arbitral actors can adhere to accepted ethical principles and produce fair
awards.
1. Ethical Norms for the Insurer and the Lawyers in UM
Arbitration
The insurer, the insurance defense attorney, and the claimant's counsel
should all abide by ethical considerations to enhance the reputation of
arbitration as an effective forum for resolving UM coverage disputes.
Insurers (such as All State, State Farm, Nationwide, and American Family)
have an obligation to act in good faith and in a fair manner with their
An arbitrator has a responsibility not only to the parties but also to the process
of arbitration itself, and must observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity
and fairness of the process will be preserved. Accordingly, an arbitrator should
recognize a responsibility to the public, to the parties whose rights will be decided,
and to all other participants in the proceeding .... Arbitrators should conduct
themselves in a way that is fair to all parties and should not be swayed by outside
pressure, public clamor, and fear of criticism or self-interest. They should avoid
conduct and statements that give the appearance of partiality toward or against any
party.
AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
Canon 1, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21958.
95 O.S.B.A. C.L.E. REFERENCE MANUAL VOLUME No. 04-10 supra note 93, § 2.12.
9 6 Id.
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insured.97 This duty to act fairly and in good faith should also extend to
situations in which the insurer and the insured are -arbitrating over UM
coverage. 98 Based on this concept, the current state of UM arbitration and the
use of the dead air silence technique come in direct conflict with the insurer's
ethical obligations. First, the agreement to arbitrate cannot be considered a
good faith action on the part of the insurer because it is unlikely that the
insurer will fully explain the implications of such a clause to the insured.99
Second, intentionally using dead air silence to create inconsistencies in the
insured claimant's testimony cannot be considered fair in any sense;
especially since the insurer understands that any forthcoming objections to
the technique will not be sustained and the arbitrator will give less weight to
any resulting inconsistencies.100 As a result, both the mandatory nature of the
arbitration, and the use of dead air silence to minimize the UM coverage
afforded to the insured, violate the insurer's ethical obligation. 101
Insurance defense lawyers' common conduct during UM arbitration also
results in potential ethical infractions. The principal rule of ethics for
insurance defense lawyers is to exercise independent professional judgment
throughout the dispute resolution proceeding.' 0 2 Under this rationale,
insurance defense lawyers are ethically required to uphold their independent
professional judgment over their personal interest or influence by others. 10 3
Accordingly, insurance defense lawyers commit ethical violations when they
97 O.S.B.A. C.L.E. REFERENCE MANUAL VOLUME No. 04-10, supra note 93, at
§ 1.3. An insurance company's requirement of acting in good faith with its insured is
defined as being faithful to its duty or obligation, and this duty is determined by
analyzing the responsibilities agreed to by the insurer in the written contract. Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 858-59 (1987); Humana Inc. v.
Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 312 (1999) (holding that insurers are under a common law duty to
negotiate with their insureds in good faith and to deal with them fairly); Hoskins v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (Ohio 1983) (concluding that in a relationship
between the insurer and the insured, an insurer has the duty to act in good faith in the
handling or the payment of the insured's claims, and thereby a lack of good faith results
in a cause of action in tort). The insurer breaching this duty of good faith entails a
dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, or conscious wrongdoing and encompasses more than
bad judgment or negligence. Hoskins, 452 N.E.2d at 1320.
98 See O.S.B.A. C.L.E. REFERENCE MANUAL VOLUME No. 04-10, supra note 93,
§ 1.3.
99 See infra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
100 See 2 WIDISS, supra note 3, at 456-58.
101 See O.S.B.A. C.L.E. REFERENCE MANUAL VOLUME No. 04-10, supra note 93,
§ 1.3.
10 2 Id. § 2.11.
103 Id. § 3.24.
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use dead air silence to limit UM coverage and harass insured claimants. 10 4
Experienced lawyers understand the effects of using dead air against
inexperienced claimants and the likely adverse effects it will have on arbitral
awards.' 05 However, the insurer's desire to limit its legal liability, combined
with the pressures an employer imposes on its employee, both precipitate the
continued use of dead air silence. As a result, insurance defense lawyers
compromise their independent professional judgment for the sake of pleasing
their employers, and thereby violate their requisite ethical obligations. 0 6
2. Ethical Boundaries for Arbitrators
Similarly to insurance defense lawyers and insurers, arbitrators must also
adhere to ethics in order to preserve the public's confidence in the arbitration
system. The first rule of ethics for arbitrators is to conduct the arbitration
proceeding in a manner that is fair to both the claimant and the insurer.10 7
Although an arbitrator has full discretion in managing the arbitration, the
procedures must provide the parties with a fair hearing. 108 The benchmarks
of fundamental fairness are considered to be met when an impartial arbitrator
provides the parties with an opportunity to make their arguments and offer
evidence in order to enable the arbitrator to make an informed decision about
the UM coverage dispute.10 9
Using the dead air silence technique in the UM arbitration context
violates arbitrators' ethical obligation to ensure the fairness of the hearing for
both parties. 110 The fundamental unfairness is present when the arbitrator
permits the use of dead air silence to continue over the objection of the
claimant's counsel. An arbitrator rarely sustains objections because the need
to protect a vulnerable jury is non-existent. 111 As a result, the arbitrator's
104 Id.
105 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
106 A.B.A. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5: A Lawyer Should
Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of his Client (2002), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mcpr.pdf (stating that "the professional judgment of a
lawyer should be exercised... free of compromising influences and loyalties").
10 7 AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES, 3upra note 94, at Canon I.A. The relevant provision states: "Arbitrators should
conduct themselves in a way that is fair to all parties." Id. at Canon I.D.
108 THE AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 5; Robbins, supra note 38, at 10.
109 See Robbins, supra note 38, at 10.
110 A. ARBITRATION ASS'N CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES, supra note 94, at Canon I.D.
11 1 See 2 WlDIss, supra note 3, at 458.
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general procedures permit the use of dead air silence to create inconsistencies
in the claimant's response despite the multiple audible objections the
claimant's lawyer is likely to raise.112 Such a practice is obviously skewed in
favor of the insurer, the repeat player in the arbitration setting, because the
same technique cannot be used with success against the insurer. 113 Thus dead
air silence results in arbitrators failing to provide a fair hearing, and thereby
leads to the arbitrator violating a rule of ethics. Accordingly, the balance of
fairness is tipped in this UM arbitration system, favoring the insurer over the
claimant.
The second ethical obligation for arbitrators is to appear and remain
impartial toward both parties throughout the arbitration. 114 An arbitrator has
a duty of impartiality with all dealings of the arbitration and must disclose to
the parties any relations that may create the appearance of partiality."l 5 Thus,
an arbitrator cannot be biased in favor of, or prejudiced against, any party,
and must also not have close personal or professional relationships with any
of the parties. 16 As a result, the main ethical boundary for an arbitrator is to
refrain from participating in any role other than that of an impartial
decisionmaker. 117
However, the arbitrator's duty of impartiality is implicitly impaired by
the subconscious interest of being appointed as the arbitrator in future
112 See id
113 The claimant's counsel cannot use dead air effectively against the insurer who is
likely being represented at the arbitration by the insurance defense lawyer. The strategy
simply would not work against the defense lawyer, who knows how to defeat it-by
simply not talking unless a question is presented. Although client counseling may inform
insured claimants on how to defeat dead air, this Note does not attempt to prescribe the
actions individuals should take. Instead, the focus of this Note is to alter the arbitration
system so that human judgment does not determine the proportion of justice the insured
claimant is to receive from the hearing.
114 AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL
DISPUTES, supra note 94. The relevant provision states: "After accepting appointment and
while serving as an arbitrator, a person should avoid entering into any business,
professional, or personal relationship, or acquiring any financial or personal interest,
which is likely to affect impartiality or which might reasonably create the appearance of
partiality." Id. at Canon I.C.
115 Gabriel & Raymond, supra note 56, at 457; See 2 WIDISS, supra note 3, at 346.
116 Gabriel & Raymond, supra note 56, at 457. The referenced section of the article
describes what constitutes an independent and an impartial arbitrator, which is required
by most national arbitration laws. Id. at 458. Implicitly then, a UM arbitrator's
appearance of impartiality would be defeated when a subconscious financial interest in
repeat business is taken into consideration. See id.
117 Id. at 464.
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arbitrations. 118 The "repeat provider" problem describes arbitrators as having
a financial incentive to ensure that the institution is pleased with the results
of the arbitration so that the institution will appoint.the same individual in the
future.1 9 The best method of securing the future appointment is to guarantee
that the company that is likely to be a repeat participant in other arbitrations
is satisfied with the present proceeding, which usually means obtaining a
favorable outcome for the insurance company. 120 This phenomenon creates a
structural bias in favor of the large companies that frequently arbitrate
disputes. With this bias, arbitrators are likely to consider the award that they
render will have an impact on their acceptability and the probability of being
appointed again. 121 Even if the arbitrator acts with and provides the
appearance of impartiality, the economic interest in repeat business creates
an inherent conflict of interest that works in favor of the company over the
individual party. 122 Consequently, an arbitrator's actions in UM arbitration
are unfairly slanted to please the insurance company with the hope of being
appointed again in future UM arbitration. Therefore, an insurance defense
lawyer's use of dead air silence is likely to be permitted to make certain that
the insurance company is satisfied with the arbitration experience.
Because an arbitrator deciding a dispute over UM coverage is likely to
violate the duty of impartiality with this inherent business interest in
satisfying the insurer, 123 a change in the structure of UM arbitration is
118 See Rau, supra note 30, at 521-22.
19 Stemlight, supra note 33, at 1650. The author refers to arbitration service
providers being in competition with each other in obtaining future appointments by
companies that frequently resolve disputes through arbitrations. Id As a result, the author
notes that service providers consciously, or subconsciously, slant the result in the
companies' favor to secure this future appointment and edge out their competition. Id.120 Id.
121 Rau, supra note 30, at 521-22 (arguing that the structural bias of arbitrators'
self-interest of future arbitral appointments is the most troubling aspect of mandatory
binding arbitrations).
122 See Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity
for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
1, 11-12 (1994) (outlining the minimal levels of due process needed in arbitrations in
order for arbitration to become a reasonable alternative to litigation). The author argues
that some aspects within the arbitration, such as the arbitrator's interest for repeat
business, make it difficult for all parties to have an equal chance for success. See id. at 3-
4. Therefore, the author concludes that the Gilmer Court may have created a national
policy in favor of arbitrating disputes, but the Court missed the opportunity to define
what process is due in arbitration so that parties to the arbitration have an equal chance of
obtaining a successful result. Id. at 27-29.
123 Rau, supra note 30, at 521-22.
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necessary. With UM disputes normally being resolved in the arbitral forum,
society, and especially injured claimants, have an interest in ensuring that
arbitration generates fair and reliable awards. 124 Thus, a system of behavior
that governs arbitral participants is needed to create the fair and reliable
awards that society expects from UM arbitration. 125 As a result, modifying
the structure of UM arbitration so that arbitrators and lawyers can adhere to
accepted ethical principals will enhance the confidence of insured claimants
to arbitrate disputes and will assure the public that the adjudicative system
works effectively. 126
III. WHAT PROCESS IS DUE?
Even though arbitration is an alternative adjudicative system, the public
still retains an expectation that arbitration will ensure predictable, fair, and
consistent interpretation of society's laws with procedural safeguards that
mirror court proceedings. 127 In fact, infusing traditional due process norms
can undeniably meet this expectation and influence the public's perception of
the arbitration process.' 28 Public trust in the dispute resolution system is
enhanced by the addition of due process principles combined with the
contemporaneous increase in the fairness and predictability of arbitrations. 129
In contrast, failure to apply due process standards in UM arbitration likely
leads to both insured claimants receiving an inadequate proportion of
justice 3 ° and an increase in public distrust of such an adjudicative practice.
Accordingly, increasing the fairness of the arbitration process necessarily
implicates incorporating due process protections.' 3 '
The first part of this section illustrates how the United States Supreme
Court determines which procedural safeguards are constitutionally necessary
124 See Gabriel & Raymond, supra note 56, at 470.
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See Stemlight, supra note 33, at 1662.
128 Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 369, 397 (2004) (arguing the benefits of placing due process
requirements in various arbitration proceedings will increase the trust the public places in
the arbitration process).
129 Sternlight, supra note 33, at 1662.
130 See Maltby, supra note 122, at 11 (concluding that procedural due process
minimums are necessary if arbitration of disputes is to become a reasonable alternative to
litigation).
131 See Harding, supra note 128, at 395-97. As a result, improving the arbitration
system entails infusing due process protections. See id.
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in a particular situation. In addition to the Supreme Court's ruling, the second
portion of this section outlines the minimal levels of due process that are
considered essential to ensure a fair arbitration experience.
A. Due Process Requirements for an Adjudicative Proceeding
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court referred to procedural due
process as the imposition of constraints on governmental actions that deprive
individuals of "liberty" or "property" interests within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause. 132 According to the Court, the fundamental requirement of
due process is the "opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner."' 133 However, the Court noted that "'due process,'
unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances."' 134 Rather, due process is a
flexible concept that "calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands."'135 All that is necessary is that the "procedures be
tailored, in light of the decision to be made, to the capacities and
circumstances of those who are to be heard."' 136
Determining the constitutional adequacy of the procedures requires
consideration of three distinct factors. 137 The first factor in finding whether
procedural due process includes analysis of the private interests that will be
affected by the action. 138 Following this, the second factor considers the risk
of the erroneous deprivation of such interests through the procedures that are
used and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural
132 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (outlining the requirements of
procedural due process and the main test in determining whether additional procedural
safeguards are mandated before an individual's liberty or property interest can be
constitutionally deprived). The case came to the Supreme Court on appeal because the
appellate court held that terminating an individual's disability benefits without an
evidentiary hearing deprived him of his procedural due process rights under the
Constitution. Id. at 325-26. However, the Court reversed, holding that procedural due
process does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to terminating disability benefits. Id.
at 349. The decision rested upon applying three distinct factors that the Court articulated,
which revealed that the private and governmental interests illustrated that the existing
procedures afforded constitutionally sufficient procedural due process. Id. at 340.
133 Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
134 Id. at 334 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
135 Id. (quoting Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
136 Id. at 349 (citation omitted).
137 Id. at 335.
138 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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safeguards. 139 Finally, the third part of the test considers the government's
interest in the process, including the resulting fiscal and administrative
burdens that additional or substitute procedural safeguards create. 140
The Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements are satisfied "if
the substitute remedy is substantial and efficient."' 141 From this principle,
arbitration qualifies as a constitutional substitute remedy that does not
require procedural changes. 142 The arbitral award in most cases provides a
substantial amount of justice to the parties, and the proceeding is an efficient
means of settling the dispute. 143 This contention is substantiated by another
Supreme Court decision that holds that arbitration is a procedurally fair
alternative to litigation. 144 Therefore, arbitrating rather than litigating the
dispute satisfies the requirements for procedural due process. 145 Despite
passing the general constitutional threshold, arbitration must still impose due
process minimums of its own in order to enhance the public trust and
confidence in the arbitral forum.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Reed v. Farmers Ins. Group, 720 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (Ill. 1999) (citing Hardware
Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 159 (1931) (holding that an
escape clause allowing the insurer to appeal an arbitral award over a certain amount
without affording the insured claimant the same right did not violate procedural due
process); Hanagan, supra note 5, at 107. The Reed decision highlights the difficulty of
making a successful constitutional attack on private arbitrations.
142 See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1059.
143 See id; Matthew J. Clark, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Pre-Dispute
Agreements Between Attorneys and Clients to Arbitrate Fee Disputes, 84 IOwA L. REv.
827, 864 (1999) (describing how arbitrating disputes over proper attorney fees is
advantageous for providing both parties a shortcut to substantial justice); Robbins, supra
note 38, at 9 (stating that the efficiency of arbitration arises from the cost-effective
proceeding that is expeditious in resolving disputes between two conflicted parties).
144 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) (upholding the district court decision to mandate arbitration of anti-trust claims
because the agreement to arbitrate was valid under the Federal Arbitration Act);
Schwartz, supra note 27, at 106 (clarifying the decision in Mitsubishi to be a conclusion
that arbitration is outcome-neutral and represents a fair alternative to litigation).
145 See Reed, 720 N.E.2d at 1059. Being successful on a constitutional attack on the
procedural insufficiencies of private arbitrations is extremely difficult. Id. Therefore, with
arbitrators rendering awards of substantial justice in an efficient proceeding, it is highly
unlikely for arbitration to be subjected to a constitutional attack. See id.
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B. Due Process Principles in Arbitration
Due process concerns in arbitration arose after the Supreme Court held
that private agreements to settle future disputes through arbitration, instead of
litigation, are enforceable. 146 In order to assure fairness and public
confidence in private arbitration, infusion of due process standards became a
necessity.147 Even though the Court allowed companies to introduce
arbitration procedures in place of litigation, the Court has not determined the
requisite structure for carrying out these procedures. 148 However, this lack of
structure does not mean the Court would authorize arbitration to exist under
any set of procedural rules. 149 Thus, because arbitration cannot proceed in
any manner, uniform procedural norms will provide parties with an
expectation as to how the dispute resolution system operates as well as a
degree of protection through application of certain safeguards.
Beginning with the mandatory clauses wherein parties agree to resolve
future disputes solely through binding arbitration, due process protections are
needed to ensure certain procedural safeguards are included in the arbitral
forum. The first additional procedural safeguard should be guaranteed access
to courts for disputes over common law claims involving the determination
of negligence and damages issues. 150 In addition, courts should only enforce
146 See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(holding that age discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration based on the
private agreement to arbitrate all disputes arising from the employment context).
147 Harding, supra note 128, at 394-95 (describing how establishing a fair
arbitration process necessarily requires the implementation of due process minimums in
order to enhance the credibility of the dispute resolution system).
148 Gilmer 500 U.S. at 26 (concluding that statutory claims may be subject to
arbitration under an enforceable private agreement and the question of arbitrability must
be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration). Although
the Court in Gilmer determined that the minimal levels of discovery, the non-public
characteristics of arbitration, inability to obtain effective appellate review, and lack of
equitable remedies are not sufficient grounds to preclude arbitration pursuant to an
enforceable agreement, the Court did not outline what procedures were necessary. Id. at
31-33. Additionally, an author of a law review article argues how the Gilmer Court only
narrowly decided that private arbitration agreements are valid as a substitute for litigation
rather than defining what procedures the arbitrator must follow. Colvin, supra note 64, at
593. Because of this void, arbitrators and arbitration service providers are free to adapt
any type of procedure they wish. Id.
149 Harding, supra note 128, at 392-93.
150 See THE AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, supra note 22, at 221. This means that the
right to judicial review must be present if parties to an arbitration agreement are to be
afforded with adequate due process. See id. At a minimum, then, due process would exist
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the mandatory arbitration provision when both parties consented to and made
a voluntary commitment to arbitrate future disputes.' 5 ' Accordingly, as a
necessary procedural safeguard, the parties must actually agree to the
mandatory arbitration clause rather than have the corporate defendant impose
the dispute resolution system upon the adherent. 152 Furthermore, arbitration
provisions should only be enforced if the procedures do not egregiously favor
one side over another. 153 This demonstrates that access to courts, consensual
agreements to arbitrate, and procedures that ensure a level playing field
between the parties, are minimal procedural due process rights in arbitration.
In addition, specific measures and requirements are necessary to
guarantee due process protections. To meet minimal standards in affording
the parties due process, the arbitration proceeding must provide: (1) adequate
and reasonable notice, (2) an impartial decisionmaker, (3) the opportunity to
present evidence, (4) an opportunity to have witnesses testify under oath, (5)
judicial review, and (6) the opportunity to have legal representation. 5 4 Most
importantly, providing adequate due process protections would require that
the arbitrator allow parties, especially the claimant, an opportunity to conduct
discovery. 155 Allowing the claimant to conduct discovery is a significant
procedural safeguard because corporate defendants frequently control the
if parties were not obligated to waive their right to bring disputes over common law
claims in court rather than being compelled to arbitrate them. See id. Even if there is
compulsory arbitration based on a valid agreement, the parties should still retain the
ability to have a court review the validity of the award and procedures utilized in the
hearing. See id.
151 2 WIDISS, supra note 3, at 323 (stating that an arbitration award should only be
enforced if the agreement to arbitrate was voluntarily made by the parties).
152 THE AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 220.
153 Colvin, supra note 64, at 585.
154 Robbins, supra note 38, at 21. Minimum requirements of due process were also
articulated to include (1) an impartial decision maker, (2) a seasoned arbitrator in the area
in dispute, (3) advance notice of the issues to be arbitrated, (4) availability of discovery,
(5) rights of comparable representation, and (6) judicial review. Maltby, supra note 122,
at 18-25. In addition, a law review article author described the core elements of due
process in arbitrations to entail basic safeguards such as "notice of the charges or issues,
the opportunity for a meaningful hearing, and an impartial decision maker." Harding,
supra note 128, at 393 (citation omitted).
155 Laurie Leader & Melissa Burger, Lets Get a Vision: Drafting Effective
Arbitration Agreements in Employment and Effecting Other Safeguards to Insure Equal
Access to Justice, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 87, 117 (2004) (commenting that
minimum levels of due process include limited discovery, limited hearsay, judicial
review, and written arbitral opinions because they are necessary to ensure fairness in the
arbitration process).
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evidence. 156 Therefore, adequate discovery would provide claimants with
access to the necessary information and documents to establish their prima
facie claim for relief.157
Even if these procedural safeguards were guaranteed, critics argue that
requiring UM disputes to be resolved through arbitration is unconstitutional
in three ways. First, mandatory arbitration denies UM injury victims the
requisite access to courts, and thereby deprives them of the due process of
law guaranteed by state and federal constitutions. 158 Second, mandatory
arbitration deprives UM injury victims of the right to a jury trial provided by
most state constitutions and the Seventh Amendment. 159 Third, mandatory
arbitration divests UM injury victims of the equal protection of law
guaranteed by both state and federal constitutions. 160 Equal protection of the
laws may be infringed in UM arbitration because insured claimants are
subject to "arbitrary and disparate treatment" based on the varying discretion
arbitrators utilize in conducting arbitrations.161
Regardless of these constitutional attacks on mandatory arbitration
provisions, courts are extremely unlikely to invalidate the agreements. 162 The
Supreme Court has demonstrated an extremely flexible approach to
determining whether a situation constitutionally satisfies the requisite due
156 Id.
157 See id.
158 Hanagan, supra note 5, at 116; Stemlight, supra note 33, at 1642 (stating that
arguments of due process violations are common in the mandatory arbitration context,
but it is very uncommon for a court to refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement on the
grounds that the parties were afforded with inadequate due process).
159 Hanagan, supra note 5, at 116; Sternlight, supra note 33, at 1643 (concluding
that the Seventh Amendment argument of claimants being deprived of their right to a jury
trial has rarely been successful despite not needing to meet the requirement of proving the
state action element). The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution states
that "in Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
160 Hanagan, supra note 5, at 116; Stemlight, supra note 33, at 1662.
161 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause is violated when differing voting procedures subject voters to "arbitrary and
disparate treatment" of tallying the votes based on the location where the voter resides);
see Sternlight, supra note 33, at 1662.
162 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (holding that
"questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy
favoring arbitration").
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process standard. 163 Moreover, the Court has also adopted a national policy
favoring arbitration and has placed arbitration agreements on the same
footing as other contracts. 164 In fact, the modem trend is "to treat arbitration
awards as presumptively valid" while strictly construing any grounds "that
would demand the invalidation of the arbitral award." 65 Accordingly, the
liberal national policy favoring arbitration and the common occurrence of
courts upholding arbitral awards impairs arguments against the
constitutionality of mandatory arbitration. 166 However, the current state of
UM arbitration deviates from the procedural protections mentioned in this
section, and thereby compels structural changes in order to provide insured
claimants a judicious proceeding as if it were conducted under a court's seal.
IV. THE UM ARBITRATION STRUCTURE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF
INSURED CLAIMANTS
The manner in which UM arbitrations are structured and conducted,
based on the unfettered discretion of likely conflicted arbitrators, violates the
procedural due process rights of insured individuals seeking UM benefits. 167
Because insured individuals are forced into the arbitral forum to resolve their
UM disputes, they unknowingly waive their right to trial and also forgo the
procedural protections afforded by judicial enforcement mechanisms. 168
Specifically, this section illustrates how the arbitration clause typically found
163 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (holding that due process "is not
a technical conception" and "calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands"). The flexibility present within the Supreme Court's definition results
in increased difficulties for parties to argue that the arbitration procedures provided
insufficient due process. See id.
164 Schwartz, supra note 27, at 81.
165 Alexander Panio, Sphere Drake Insurance Limited v. All American Life
Insurance Company: The Seventh Circuit Continues the Evisceration of the Dictum in
Commonwealth Coatings, 2 J. AM. ARB. 405, 416 (2003) (describing how the Seventh
Circuit in Sphere Drake narrowly interpreted the "evident partiality" standard under the
Federal Arbitration Act in order to put forth a general policy in favor of upholding
arbitration awards). To get an arbitral award vacated for evident partiality, the moving
party must demonstrate "that the arbitrator had an interest in the subject matter of the
arbitration or a pre-existing business or social relationship with one of the parties or
counsel, which would color the arbitrator's judgment." Robbins, supra note 38, at 11.
Basically, if the arbitrator remains neutral and avoids the appearance of bias, then
vacating an award on the evident partiality standard will be unsuccessful. See id.
166 See Schwartz, supra note 27, at 81; see Panio, supra note 165, at 416.
167 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 1-2.
168 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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in UM policies, the management of an arbitration proceeding, and the limited
opportunity for judicial review of arbitral awards highlight some of the
aspects most threatening to individual rights. When the Matthews Test is
applied to the current state of UM arbitration, an individual's procedural due
process rights are infringed, which leads to the inevitable conclusion that the
dispute resolution system needs to be changed. 169
A. The UMArbitration Clause
Involuntarily agreeing to arbitrate future UM disputes constitutes one of
the major deficiencies in the UM arbitration clause. One important due
process principle is that a policy provision which mandates that future
disputes be resolved in arbitration should be enforced only when both parties
make a voluntary and informed commitment to arbitrate. 170 However, for a
variety of reasons, this necessary voluntary consent is often missing, with
large insurance companies effectively coercing weaker parties, through
adhesion contracts and boilerplate language, into arbitrating all future
disputes arising from UM coverage. 171
In addition to the take-it-or-leave-it policy provision, 172 other aspects of
the UM policy impair the purchaser's ability to voluntarily consent to
mandatory arbitration. For example, the purchasers of UM coverage do not
have an opportunity to inspect the policy terms until several weeks after the
purchase, when the insurance policy arrives in the mail. 173 Moreover, once
the insured obtains the lengthy policy, the mandatory UM arbitration clause
is usually placed in the middle, conveniently beyond the range of focus for
the insured. 174 Accordingly, the insured is unlikely to discover the arbitration
169 See discussion infra Part W.D.
170 THE AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 217-19. The institutional author
notes that numerous circumstances may undermine the insured's ability to voluntarily
agree to arbitrate a dispute over allocation of UM coverage. Id. at 217-18. These include
an inability to bargain over the policy terms, being unaware of the arbitration provision,
and agreeing to the policy before having an opportunity to examine the terms. Id.
171 See Feingold, supra note 29, at 284.
172 See supra notes 21-33 and accompanying text (describing how UM arbitration
clause is an adhesion-like contract where the individual is not really voluntarily
submitting to arbitrate future disputes).
173 See Feingold, supra note 29, at 284; Hanagan, supra note 5, at 126.
174 2 WiDIss, supra note 3, at 321-22 (commenting on how the UM arbitration
clause is usually in the middle of a lengthy policy full of small print). Professor Widiss
also states that most readers of the policy will be alert while reading the first portion of
the policy, but attentiveness subsides as he or she continues reading. Id. Therefore, by
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clause until a dispute arises over whether the insured is legally entitled to
obtain UM benefits.175 Even if the insured discovers the arbitration clause in
middle of the complicated insurance policy, most individuals do not
comprehend that arbitration is different from litigation, and that they are
effectively waiving their right to bring UM disputes into court. 176 Therefore,
because individuals with UM coverage do not typically read the mandatory
arbitration clause, nor do they understand the actual meaning of the terms,
voluntary consent in arbitrating future UM disputes is missing.' 77 Insureds
being forced into arbitration and surrendering their procedural due process
rights without knowingly consenting to such a proceeding illustrates the
unfairness present in UM arbitration. As a result, the involuntary submission
to arbitrate and the possibility of being denied due process fortifies the reality
that a change to the UM arbitration structure is necessary.
The lack of voluntary consent to arbitrate future UM disputes with the
experienced insurance company has far-reaching implications. With the
threatening presence of involuntariness, the insured protected by UM
coverage should not lose the right to bring disputes in a court of law.' 78
However, typical arbitration clauses mandate that if the insured and insurer
disagree about the existence of UM coverage or the actual amount of
damages, then both parties are required to resolve the dispute through
arbitration. 179 Despite the involuntary submission to arbitration, the insured
placing the pre-dispute arbitration clause in the middle, most policyholders will not read
the provision, or even understand what the nature of such an arbitration clause entails. Id.
In fact, most policyholders become aware of the arbitration requirement for the first time
when a dispute arises. Id. This supports Widiss' comment that the parties may not have
voluntarily agreed to arbitrate disputes over the UM policy since the policyholder most
likely did not get an opportunity to read the arbitration clause. See id.
175 Id. Professor Widiss argues that since the insured is unaware of the arbitration
provision until an actual dispute arises, there is no voluntary consent. Id.
176 Stemlight, supra note 33, at 1648. This is not to say that insurance companies
have a duty to inform the purchaser of the arbitration provision. The Note does not argue
that insurance companies breach a duty to their insured. However, aspects of the policy
serve to ensure, whether intentionally or not, that the insured does not voluntarily agree to
arbitrate or even understand the nature of the arbitration clause. See 2 WrDiss, supra note
3, at 322-25 (stating that individuals are unlikely to discover the UM arbitration clause in
the middle of a lengthy policy or will not understand the implications of compulsory
arbitration, and therefore individuals do not knowledgably consent to submitting disputes
for arbitration).
177 2 WIDISS, supra note 3, at 322-25.
17 8 1d. at 322.
179 Id. at 297. One law review article compiled data comparing the differences
between arbitration and litigation. See generally Schwartz, supra note 27, at 65-66. The
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individual is denied access to court based on the policy language alone. As a
result, the mandatory arbitration clause in UM policies substitutes a private
system of justice forced onto claimants in exchange for surrendering their
right to have a jury decide common law claims, the right to a public hearing,
the right to discovery of evidence in the possession of others, and the right to
appeal legal or factual errors. 180 Thus, if the structure of UM arbitration was
to remain the same, then the playing field would persuasively favor the
insurance company that coercively imposed the mandatory arbitration on the
insured and fully understood the import of the arbitration clause as
effectively displacing the courts. Accordingly, if individuals are to perceive
arbitration as providing an equitable proportion of justice, a change is
required so that insured claimants can actually consent to the prospective
arbitration of disputes and voluntarily waive the procedural right to access
the courts.
B. The UMArbitration Proceeding
Three aspects of the UM arbitration proceeding bring the method of
dispute resolution into question as violative of procedural due process rights:
(1) the inordinate flexibility arbitrators have in managing the arbitration
process, (2) the effective displacement of procedural safeguards found in
court, and (3) the dangers facing pro se claimants. The flexibility in
determining the procedure places no legal mandate on arbitrators to ensure
due process principles are reinforced. In addition, displacing the judiciary
denies insured claimants avenues of procedural safeguards found in state and
federal courts. Furthermore, vulnerable pro se claimants probably cannot
withstand the injurious effects of dead air silence. Thus, the UM arbitration
proceeding, in its current state, removes the assurance that claimants are
receiving an equitable proportion of justice and reduces the semblance of
legal legitimacy in arbitration.
median jury verdict award was $264,700 while the median arbitration award was
$49,400. Id. This means half of the claimants in this study received an arbitral award
below $49,500. See id. Additionally, for tort claims, the jury decided for the aggrieved
plaintiff 47.1% of the time while an arbitrator only deemed the claimant the victor 17.9%
of the time. Id. Based on this data, arbitration avoids the large awards found in jury trials
and also has a greater chance for the corporate defendant to be victorious over the
claimant seeking relief. See id.
180 Hanagan, supra note 5, at 125.
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1. Inordinate Discretion ofArbitrators in Determining Arbitral
Procedures
When UM coverage issues are submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator has
full discretion and authority to determine how the proceeding is to be
conducted, even if the procedures are not identical to those followed in a
court of law. 181 Therefore, an arbitrator has the flexibility to determine
whether discovery will be allowed, which evidence can be considered in
deciding the dispute, how witnesses will be utilized, and other general
matters pertaining to arbitration. 182 In no instance will the arbitrator be
required to provide the same process found in the courts, and this lack of
similar due process protections erodes UM arbitration's appearance of
fairness. 183 Because the arbitrators are under no obligation to follow the rules
of evidence, they will infrequently entertain objections in order to preserve
the simplicity of the arbitration. 184 Although lawyers often object to
improper witness testimony, the arbitrator's discretion favors allowing
testimony to proceed over audible objections because a vulnerable jury is not
181 See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 40 (1987)
(holding that when the subject matter of the dispute can be arbitrated, the procedural
questions as to how the hearing is to be conducted are deferred to the arbitrator); see
generally 2 WiDiss, supra note 3, at 455.
182 See Misco, 484 U.S. at 40.
183 The fairness standards between arbitration and litigation can be comparable
without being completely equal. But this is not the problem. If arbitrators provide the
parties procedural safeguards, such as discovery, then arbitrations will appear much more
legitimate. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute
Resolution Processes: What's Happening and What's Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 949,
949-51 (2002). However, there is no requirement that arbitrators afford parties any sort
of procedure at all. See Misco 484 U.S. at 40. Then the proper goal is to create a system
where minimal levels of procedural safeguards are required to be found in all UM
arbitrations. Without some force of law, arbitrators are not required to provide due
process minimums. This is the major problem surrounding UM arbitrations and illustrates
the need to change the present structure.
184 2 WIDISS, supra note 3, at 456-58. This proposition is based on UM arbitrations
the author attended during the summer of 2005. When objections were presented by
either the insurance defense lawyer or the claimant's counsel, the arbitrator rarely
sustained objections. The common response was that the current proceeding was
arbitration and not litigation in courts. Thus, the arbitrators were acting under the premise
that arbitration was distinct from litigation, making it unnecessary to entertain objections
traditionally heard in court.
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present. 185 Moreover, the arbitrator also has full authority in determining
how much weight should be credited to each evidentiary matter and should
generally "evaluate evidence for what it is worth."'186
The arbitral procedures pertaining to objections and the weight given to
evidence encourages insurance companies to use dead air silence in avoiding
or reducing UM coverage obligations to its insured. With arbitrators lacking
the vulnerabilities of a jury and wanting to maintain the simplicity of the
hearing, 187 objections to insurance defense lawyers using dead air to discredit
the insured will likely be unsuccessful.1 88 Instead, the arbitrator will permit
the insured's testimony to continue over the objection and enable the dead air
to take effect.189 Because the arbitrator gives weight to evidence for what it is
worth, inconsistent testimony will be accorded less weight, and thereby most
likely will result in a lower, if any, arbitral award. 190 Although the claimant
may be legally entitled to the full policy limits, the present structure of UM
arbitration has the ability to prevent proper recovery. Therefore, the
inordinate discretion given to arbitrators in allowing testimony to continue
over objections and allocating weight to evidence results in the insureds
losing out on procedural safeguards found in judicial proceedings that would
protect them from such damaging tactics. Without uniform procedures,
nothing obligates arbitrators to add safeguards comparable to the judicial
system unless the structure of UM arbitration is changed.
185 Id. at 458. This is where the dead air silence technique reveals the dangers
claimants face during UM arbitrations. The claimant's lawyer will likely object to the
insurance defense lawyer's use of dead air; but because the arbitrator does not sustain
objections, dead air silence is allowed to continue and have its effect on the
inexperienced claimant.
186 Id. at 456-58.
187 During a UM arbitration this author attended, the claimant's counsel objected to
the extensive time the supervising attorney was taking in presenting questions. However,
the arbitrator overruled the objection to maintain the simplicity of the proceeding.
188 See 2 WiDiss, supra note 3, at 456-58. Professor Widiss states that arbitrators
allow the entry of all types of evidence, even over the objections of opposing parties, to
help determine whether the insured is entitled to recover from the insurer. Id. at 456. In
addition, the arbitrator attaches the proper weight to evidence in making this decision. Id.
at 456-57. Thus, an inconsistent testimony produced by dead air will receive less weight,
and therefore adversely affect the insured claimant's arbitral award. See id.
189 See id. at 458.
190 See id. at 456-58.
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2. Mandatory UMArbitration Proceedings Displace the Judiciary
Arbitration is inherently distinct from the judicial process, and thereby
does not contain the same protective devices. In an arbitration proceeding,
the parties choose the arbitrator, or multiple decisionmakers, and in turn the
arbitrator determines how the proceeding will be conducted. 19 1 In contrast, in
a judicial proceeding, an officer of the state decides the matter based on
principles of law that are often published and available for use as
precedent.' 92 Additionally, while civil litigation is governed by a body of
judicial and legislative standards, arbitration is virtually unregulated because
the same judicial and legislative principles are not applicable. 193
Consequently, resorting to arbitration effectively displaces procedures and
safeguards that the judiciary provides, which is especially harmful to an
individual who does not voluntarily consent to arbitrate the dispute.
The first major procedural aspect highlighted in litigation, but
significantly minimized in arbitration, is discovery. Under the current UM
arbitration structure, there is only an opportunity for limited discovery, 194
and because the arbitrator has full discretion to determine how to manage the
hearing, discovery may not even be granted to the parties. 195 Furthermore,
formal discovery procedures, found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
are unavailable in connection with the arbitration process. 196 As a result,
parties do not have the right to discover any relevant material that is not
privileged 197 or request production .of documents.' 98 Thus, parties in UM
191 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra note 183, at 949-51 (arguing that
transparency, disclosure, rules, sanctions, and consequences that attach to arbitrators are
needed if arbitration is to have any semblance of legal legitimacy).
192 Id. at 949.
193 Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An
Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343, 362 (1995)
(describing the flexibility of commercial arbitrators in defining the procedural aspects of
the hearing and the significant differences between arbitrating and litigating the matter in
court).
194 2 WlDISS, supra note 3, at 453.
195 Id. at 519.
196 Id. at 452-53.
197 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party .... Relevant information
need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence."). This rule shows the liberal attitude towards
discovery in judicial proceedings, and thereby allows parties an opportunity to obtain
pertinent information in building their case.
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arbitration do not have the tools that are available in court to build their case
and support the elements of their argument. However, in a judicial
proceeding, the state or federal court is required to abide by rules of
procedure and afford parties liberal discovery rights. Therefore, having at-
best limited discovery illustrates an example of how arbitrating a UM dispute
displaces the judiciary.
Similarly, the arbitration system does not adhere to the codified rules of
evidence as is required in the judicial system. Since arbitrations do not have
jurors to protect, the rules of evidence play an insignificant role in how the
arbitrator manages the UM hearing. 199 Without the rules of evidence, the
parties to a UM arbitration will not enjoy certain mandated protections, such
as prohibition of unreliable hearsay testimony.200 However, courts are
obligated to be constrained under either state or federal rules of evidence,
ensuring that parties receive the protections called for by the rules and that
evidentiary matters maintain the indicia of reliability. 20 1 Thus, failure to
adhere to any rules of evidence is another example of how mandatory UM
arbitration of disputes displaces the judiciary.
Of significant importance is that arbitration hearings lack the numerous
checks present in the litigation system that further ensure accurate and fair
results. First, the doctrine of res judicata and the beneficial effect of
constraining arbitrators to precedent through stare decisis are inapplicable in
198 FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) ("Any party may serve on any other party a request to
produce ... to inspect and copy, any designated documents .... "). In arbitrations, no
such procedure to compel the opposing party to produce documents exists. Therefore, this
rule provides another example of how the judiciary is displaced with mandatory binding
arbitrations.
199 THE AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 65; Hayford & Peeples, supra
note 193, at 364 (stating that the American Arbitration Association rules do not mandate
that federal and state rules of evidence are applicable in the arbitration context).
200 FED. R. EviD. 801. Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." Id. Arbitrators, who are not bound by the rules of evidence, could allow
hearsay testimony despite its questionable indicia of reliability. Therefore, judicial
proceedings not allowing hearsay testimony, unless properly excluded or exempted,
illustrates another aspect of how UM arbitrations displace the judiciary.
201 Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse: Judicial Review of
Arbitration Awards, 45 BuFF. L. REv. 49, 133-34 (1997) (arguing that arbitrators are not
bound by formal rules of evidence and procedure as judges are). The author states that
some may applaud this flexibility to technical rules, but others believe that following
technical rules enhances the fairness of the process. Id. at 133. When arbitrators rule on
evidentiary matters, they often are more lenient than judges who are bound by fulfilling
the parties' sense of fairness. Id,
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UM arbitration. 20 2 Second, parties to the arbitration do not have the
procedural safeguard of petitioning the court for remittitur and addititur.
20 3
These two devices would enable the parties to either reduce or increase the
award that the arbitrator renders. 204 Courts, on the other hand, provide all of
the aforementioned types of protections. 20 5 These protections enhance the
legal legitimacy of civil litigation, and also provide boundaries within which
the proceeding must remain. Implementing such boundaries in UM
arbitration would give both the insured and the insurer an expectation of how
the hearing would proceed, rather than forcing the parties to rely on the
unlimited discretion of the arbitrator. The lack of res judicata, stare decisis,
and measures to increase or reduce an arbitral award convincingly illustrate
how UM arbitration displaces the courts, leaving the insured claimant
unprotected from the checks found in the civil litigation system.
3. Additional Difficulties with Pro Se Claimants
The inadequacies present in the UM arbitration structure are undoubtedly
revealed when the arbitral hearing involves a pro se claimant.20 6 If the
insured claimant lacks the representation of counsel, then additional
safeguards should be implemented because "unsophisticated [parties] are
exactly the ones who are most likely to need protection from exploitation.
'
"
20 7
Moreover, a study found that claimants who have legal representation during
202 Hayford & Peeples, supra note 193, at 378.
203 Id. at 379.
204 THOMAs D. ROWE, JR., SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CIVIL PROCEDURE
273 (2004). The casebook describes both remittitur and additur. Id. Remittitur passes the
test under the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution but additur does not.
Id. However, states generally allow the additur procedure to occur. Id. Because these
procedures are absent in an arbitration illustrates another example of how mandatory
binding arbitration displaces the judiciary.
205 See Davis, supra note 201, at 133-34.
206 See Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten: Twenty
Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
165,195-96 (2005).
207 Id. One law review author stated that claimants would be well advised to appear
pro se in arbitrations where the total claim is below $20,000. Alan R. Bromberg,
Securities Industry Arbitrations: An Examination and Analysis, 53 ALB. L. REV. 755, 798
(1989). This means that many claimants in UM arbitrations may appear pro se based on
the fact that their claims do not exceed $20,000. See id. Thus, the likely presence of
multiple pro se claimants illustrates further need for a change to the UM arbitration
structure. See id.
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arbitration have a higher probability of obtaining a favorable award.20 8
Therefore, pro se insured claimants arbitrating the existence of UM coverage
are generally weaker than claimants who have retained counsel.20 9
Specific characteristics of pro se claimants demonstrate vulnerabilities
that do not exist for individuals who enjoy legal representation. Common
failings of pro se claimants include: (1) unsupported statements of the claim;
(2) failure to properly prepare for the hearing; (3) intimidation by the arbitral
forum and process; (4) intimidation by the presence of the insurer's counsel;
and (5) lack of litigation skills.2 10 Based on the pro se claimant's relative
weaknesses, opposing counsel frequently crosses the thin line between
appropriate advocacy for the client and detrimental harassment of a pro se
claimant.211
As the situation presently stands in UM arbitration, subjecting vulnerable
unrepresented individuals to the additional effect of dead air silence
overwhelmingly tips the balance of fairness in favor of the insurance
company. 212 Pro se claimants, who may be intimidated by the arbitration
process and lack the legal knowledge to assert an adequate claim, 213 will not
know how to properly combat the persistent silence or be aware of its
controversial use. All that the pro se insureds know is that their prior answer
does not appear credible to the opposing side, and that additional elaboration
is needed to clarify the claim for relief.2 14 Although arbitrating without legal
representation is the insured's decision, this Note does not seek to propose
the correct choices for individuals to make. Rather, this author's intent is to
remedy the present UM arbitration framework so that human judgment does
not determine the proportion of justice an insured claimant is to receive from
the mandatory hearing. Accordingly, the combined effect of arbitrators'
unlimited discretion to manage the process, the effective displacement of the
208 Shelly R. James, Arbitration in the Securities Field: Does the Present System of
Arbitration Between Small Investors and Brokerage Firms Really Protect Anyone?, 21 J.
CORP. L. 363, 380 (1996). The article's author describes how 60% of the claimants that
are represented by a lawyer during arbitrations obtain a favorable award. Id. By contrast,
40% of pro se claimants were victorious during arbitration. Id.
209 Bales, supra note 206, at 195-96; Bromberg, supra note 207, at 798.
210 See J. Kirkland Grant, Securities Arbitration: Is Required Arbitration Fair to
Investors?, 24 NEW ENG. L. REv. 389, 489 (1989).
211 Marshall J. Nachbar, Securities Arbitration: An Arbitrator's Perspective, 601
SEC. ARB. 635, 648-49 (1988).
212 See id.
213 See id.
214 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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judiciary, and the visible dangers to pro se claimants, is more than sufficient
to necessitate procedural changes to UM arbitration.
C. Limited Judicial Review ofArbitral Awards
Although arbitral awards are subject to judicial enforcement, the level of
judicial review to ensure the arbitrator made accurate applications of law to
fact is extremely minimal, which almost always renders arbitral awards the
final outcome to the UM coverage dispute. 215 When an arbitrator issues the
award articulating the decision made on the UM claim, the award is
complete, final, and binding on the parties to the dispute.216 In fact, courts
are to accord the UM arbitral award a high degree of finality and are
prohibited from challenging the sufficiency of the proof used to support the
award.217 As a result, courts have shown great reluctance to overturn an
arbitrator's decision.218 Instead, the proper methodology for a reviewing
court is to defer to an arbitrator's ruling, even if it is wrong on its face and
causes substantial injustice.219 Therefore, a UM arbitration award is in
actuality a final resolution of the conflict between the insurer and the insured
claimant seeking UM benefits. 220
215 THE AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 5.
216 Id.
217 See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) (holding
that courts play a limited role when reviewing an arbitrator's decision and are not
authorized to reconsider the merits of the award even if the parties allege errors of fact or
misapplication of law); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (stating that as long as the arbitrator's award does not reflect his or
her own brand of justice, then the award is legitimate); 2 WIDISS, supra note 3, at 482
(describing the limitations courts adhere to when enforcing an arbitration award while
also according the arbitral award a high degree of finality over the dispute).
218 THE AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 66; see Mobil Oil Indonesia, Inc.
v. Asamera Oil, Ltd., 487 F. Supp. 63, 65-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying motion to vacate
an arbitral award because the panel's statement of reasons had a "barely colorable"
justification for the outcome and the decision was not "infested with complete
irrationality").
219 THE AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, supra note 22, at 66; see Moncharsh v. Heily &
Blasd, 832 P.2d 899, 900 (Cal. 1992) (holding that an arbitrator's awards are not subject
to judicial review for errors of fact and law even if such errors appear on the face of the
award and cause the parties substantial injustice). This fortifies the reality that the
arbitration award is regarded as the final resolution of the dispute not subject to extensive
judicial review. Therefore, an arbitral award for a UM dispute between an insured and the
insurer is likely going to be the final outcome that resolves the quarrel.
220 Meyerowitz, supra note 10, at 79.
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The narrow judicial review of arbitration awards presents significant
problems for insured claimants subjected to the dead air silence technique.
As described, when insurance defense lawyers use dead air, the insured
claimant will probably offer inconsistent testimony in order to remedy the
growing tension produced by the silence. Because the likely result is for the
arbitrator to award the insured claimant a lower, if any, recovery than was
expected, the narrow judicial review trend becomes a considerable obstacle
to achieving the proper relief.2 2 1 Based on this presumption of upholding
arbitral awards as the final resolution to the dispute, the insured claimant
subjected to dead air silence will be stuck with the inadequate award. Thus,
the inability to challenge the arbitration proceeding that enabled the dead air
silence tactic and caused a lower recovery highlights the unfairness of the
UM arbitration structure. In order for arbitration to obtain legal legitimacy,
some grounds for judicial review are needed to prevent the insured claimant
from obtaining a miscarriage ofjustice.222
221 2 WIDIss, supra note 3, at 456-57 (describing arbitrators allocating weight to
specific evidence even though the evidence may be improper under standards utilized in a
judicial proceeding); THE AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 5 (outlining how
arbitral awards are final and binding upon the parties irrespective of the judicial
enforcement aspect).
222 An additional argument, described earlier, is that arbitrators have a business
interest in managing arbitrations in a manner that increases their future arbitral
appointments. Rau, supra note 30, at 521. Although an arbitrator is impartial throughout
the proceeding, an economic interest in repeat business creates an inherent conflict of
interest that effectively works against the insured claimant seeking relief. See Maltby,
supra note 122, at 12.
Based on this interest of obtaining future referrals, arbitrators are likely to favor
insurance companies in UM coverage disputes for two reasons. First, the insurance
company, rather than the insured, is highly likely to be a repeat player in arbitration
proceedings, and thereby act as a reliable source for repeat business. Rau, supra note 30,
at 524-25. Second, the insurance company, being the institutional repeat player, is likely
to develop an "institutional memory." Id. at 525. This means that the insurer, and not the
insured, will have the incentive to investigate the arbitrator's background and monitor his
or her past awards. Id. Thus, UM arbitrators are naturally conflicted towards pleasing the
insurance company through subconsciously skewed arbitration decisions in hopes of
obtaining future arbitral appointment. Regardless of the merits of the dispute, UM
arbitration decisions have a strong likelihood of being tainted because of the insurer-
favoritism. Accordingly, the partiality of UM arbitrators increases the steepness of the
hill insured claimants must try to climb in obtaining the appropriate arbitral award.
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D. Applying the Three Factors in Matthews to UMArbitrations
Application of the Matthews Test demonstrates that procedural due
process improvements are warranted in the UM arbitration structure because
of its constitutional inadequacies. 223 The significant private interests
involved are apparent when insured claimants obtain a deficient recovery
after being forced into an arbitral forum, have their rights determined by the
inordinate discretion of an arbitrator, waive the protections found in court,
and lose the opportunity for judicial review.224 Moving to the second prong
of the test, an erroneous deprivation of the proper UM recovery is possible
because of unpredictable arbitral procedures, non-adherence to judicial
protections, and the improper techniques used by insurance defense
lawyers. 225 On the other hand, substituted procedures that ensure voluntary
consent of the insured to arbitrate, a uniform procedural system of arbitrating
UM disputes, and a greater degree of judicial review would enhance the
fairness of results while increasing public confidence in the dispute
resolution system.226 Moreover, the third criterion shows that the
government's interest in an improved UM arbitration system will not
increase the administrative costs. 227 The government, as a result, will be
benefited by having more individuals willing to arbitrate their disputes rather
than clogging up the civil litigation system. Therefore, procedural due
process in the current UM arbitration structure is inadequate because
significant private interests are impaired and because there is value in
implementing substituted procedural safeguards that do not increase
governmental administrative costs. Considering these factors, the "specific
dictates of due process" are violated, necessitating structural reforms to UM
arbitration.
V. BARRIERS TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CHANGES IN UM
ARBITRATION
According to the aforementioned Matthews analysis, the current state of
UM arbitration violates the Due Process Clause because significant private
interests are impaired, there is high probability of erroneous deprivation of
private rights under current UM arbitration procedures, and the government
223 See infra notes 224-227 and the accompanying text.
224 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 See id.
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interest would be benefited by changes to the procedures.228 Despite the need
for constitutional conformity, many significant barriers are present to prevent
structural reforms in UM arbitration. One such barrier is the consideration of
whether state action actually exists in UM arbitration and is sufficient to
bring the dispute resolution system under the ambit of the Due Process
Clause.229 In addition, a second barrier is whether the FAA is applicable to
UM arbitration.230 If the FAA applies to UM arbitration, then claimants
would be entitled to access the courts after receiving arbitral awards under
federal question jurisdiction,231 and thereby receive due process protections
from federal courts. However, if the FAA does not apply, then federal courts
can only hear the UM dispute if diversity of citizenship exists and the amount
in controversy is met; but this is highly unlikely to be satisfied in the UM
context.23
2
A. The State Action Problem
Based on the current framework of UM arbitration, there are numerous
arguments against the existence of state action, thereby perpetuating the
dispute resolution system's procedural due process inadequacies.233 UM
arbitration is private, and the arbitrators managing the process are not
deemed government officials.234 As a result, a non-governmental official,
like an arbitrator deciding a UM dispute, can deny "due process of law"
228 See discussion supra Part IV.D.
229 See discussion infra Part V.A.
230 See discussion infra Part V.B.
231 28 U.S.C § 1331 (2004). The statute provides that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States." Id.
232 See infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text (arguing the probable
inapplicability of the FAA, which eliminates the procedural safeguards associated with
federal courts upon obtaining jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
233 Sternlight, supra note 33, at 1642-43 (establishing state involvement sufficient
to rise to a level of state action between two private parties agreeing to arbitrate is very
difficult to prove); Harding, supra note 128, at 393-94 (concluding that courts have
consistently held that private arbitrations lack any element of state action and therefore
are not subject to constitutional requirements of procedural due process).
234 See Holmes v. Nat'l Football League, 939 F. Supp. 517, 523-24 (N.D. Tex.
1996) (holding that the arbitrator depriving the football player of the right to cross
examine and introduce expert testimony did not violate procedural due process because
arbitrators are private actors not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause).
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without giving rise to a constitutional complaint. 235 Because of the state
action doctrine and the absence of state action elements, private UM
arbitration would not have to comport with the requirements of procedural
due process found in the Fourteenth Amendment.236
As a general rule, constitutional due process protections do not extend to
private conduct abridging individual rights. 237 Thus, only state action is
subject to scrutiny under the Due Process Clause.238 The test for determining
the existence of state action is whether the state provided a mantle of
authority that enhanced the power of the harm-causing individual actor.239
According to the test, arbitrators in UM arbitrations that deny common
procedural safeguards found in judicial proceedings do not enhance their
powers under the authority of the state, but rather obtain their powers based
on the agreement of the parties.240 Accordingly, UM arbitrators would not be
considered state actors, and their common denial of procedural due process
safeguards would not be considered a constitutional violation under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, the missing state action element in UM
arbitration provides no legal authority mandating procedural due process
changes to the UM arbitration structure.
Moreover, there is a public policy argument against making arbitration
subject to the scrutiny of constitutional review. Requiring UM arbitration to
adhere to the procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment would constitutionalize the private dispute resolution system. 24 1
Consequently, the simplicity, informality, and appeal of the arbitral forum as
an alternative means for resolving disputes would be seriously undermined
235 See id.
236 Harding, supra note 128, at 393-94; U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § I ("nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .. "). Based on these words, states, or actors representing the state, must deprive
due process of law in order for the constitutional right to be infringed. This creates the
state action doctrine.
237 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (deciding
that the method in which the NCAA fired Tarkanian did not deprive him of procedural
due process because the NCAA did not get its mantle of authority from state law, and
thereby was not a state actor subject to constitutional restrictions).
238 Id.
239 Id. at 192.
240 See THE AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 5.
241 See Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 1995)
(deciding that the limited state action of confirming arbitral awards is insufficient for
mandating arbitrators to comply with the Federal Due Process Clause under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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by adhering to the Constitution's requirements. 242 Therefore, policy against
constitutionalizing UM arbitration will ensure that the state action element
remains missing.
There is one argument that suggests that arbitration satisfies the state
action element, and thereby is subject to the Due Process Clause. In Shelley
v. Kraemer,243 the Supreme Court held that a court's enforcement of a
private contract constitutes state action within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause.244 Extending this rationale, because courts must enforce
arbitration awards for the decision to become effective, 245 a plausible
argument for the existence of state action in private arbitration exists.
However, the principles in Shelley have been limited to the specific facts of
the case,246 and multiple federal courts decline to recognize the limited court
involvement present in arbitration as state action sufficient to trigger the Due
Process Clause.247
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's ruling in Shelley, UM arbitration is
unlikely to contain elements of state action that would trigger adherence to
constitutional procedural due process requirements. Although state action
presents a formidable barrier to procedural due process improvements, a
change to the insurer-created UM arbitration structure is necessary so that
insured claimants can receive their equitable proportion of justice and the
public can have confidence in the dispute resolution system. Accordingly,
effectively altering the UM arbitration structure should probably be
independent of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.
242 Id.
243 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
244 Id. at 19-20 (holding that a state court enforcing a restrictive covenant that
prohibits African-Americans from living in a specific residential area was considered
enough state action for purposes of meeting the Fourteenth Amendment requirement).
245 See 2 WIDiss, supra note 3, at 481.
246 See generally Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 81 (1992) (arguing that even though parties to an arbitration opted out of the
judicial system including its constitutional protections, many of the arbitral participants
lacked knowledge of the implications of their agreement to arbitrate, and thereby some
measures of due process are needed if arbitration is to convey a notion of fairness).
247 Davis, 59 F.3d at 1192; United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and
Publishers, 708 F. Supp. 95, 96-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that mere court approval of
an arbitral award is not state action, and thereby arbitrators are not subject to
constitutional due process limitations).
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B. Applicability of the FAA
The FAA requires courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to
arbitrate disputes, like any other contract, in accordance with their terms. 248
Applicability of the FAA requires the arbitration agreement to "evidenc[e] a
transaction involving commerce." 249 Once an arbitration agreement is found
to affect commerce, the agreement will be declared "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable." 250 Combined with this liberal policy favoring the enforceability
of arbitration agreements are numerous grounds upon which an arbitration
award can be vacated due to arbitrator misconduct. 251 These statutory
grounds for vacating an arbitral award enable an insured seeking UM
benefits to obtain due process protections in federal court after being
subjected to deficient procedural safeguards in the UM arbitration.
The FAA mandates that courts supervise arbitration affecting commerce
to ensure that the arbitral proceeding provides due process protections. 252
Section 10 of the FAA allows courts to vacate an arbitration award if the
248 9 U.S.C. § 2. The relevant provision states that
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction. .. shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). The relevant provision is as follows:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration-
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
252 See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
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award was procured through "undue means," 253 or if the arbitrator's
misconduct caused the "rights" of any party to be prejudiced.254 The FAA's
"undue means" and "rights" language focuses on procedures, requiring
judges to look for procedural irregularities. 255 Because the act of finding
procedural inconsistencies is evident in the framework of the due process
standard, arbitration within the FAA must follow a correct procedural
model. 256 Additionally, the term "rights" may be in reference to
constitutional rights because there are no other rights that could exist in the
context of a federal statute. 257 The cumulative effect of the "undue means"
and "rights" language mandates the implementation of constitutional due
process minimums for arbitration under the FAA.258 Accordingly, arbitration
within the ambit of the FAA must incorporate due process protections.
Constitutional procedural due process minimums would have to be
adhered to if the FAA governed UM arbitration. In order for UM arbitration
to fall under the FAA, the arbitration must satisfy the jurisdictional nexus of
affecting interstate commerce. 259 With insurance considered a subject of
commerce, if the insured and insurer reside in different states, then the UM
insurance policy would affect interstate commerce, thus triggering FAA
governance.260 However, if the insured and insurer reside in the same state,
then the effect on commerce would be intrastate, resulting in the UM
arbitration policy falling beyond the scope of the FAA. 26 1 In all likelihood,
the insured and insurer will be from the same state-because logically and in
general, most people purchase automobile insurance from a company located
within their state of residence 262-which would suggest the UJM arbitration
253 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1) (stating that grounds for vacating an arbitral award exists
when "the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means").
254 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (stating that grounds for vacating an arbitral award exists
when "the rights of any party have been prejudiced").
255 Maltby, supra note 122, at 16.
256 Id.
257 Id.
2 58 Id. at 16-17.
259 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
260 THE AM ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 62. The institutional author
describes that if the insurer and the insured live in different states, then the policy
governing this relationship would affect interstate commerce. Id. As a result, the
jurisdictional nexus of FAA would be satisfied, and thereby require courts to ensure due
process protections are provided in UM arbitrations. See Maltby, supra note 122, at 16-
17.
261 THE AM ARBITRATION Ass'N, supra note 22, at 62.
262 See id.
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clause involves intrastate commerce. As a result, UM policies will most
likely fail to satisfy the jurisdictional nexus requirement of the FAA;
therefore, legal authority to mandate procedural changes in the UM
arbitration structure is probably missing.
The likely inapplicability of the FAA can still get insured claimants the
due process protections equivalent to a judicial proceeding if federal courts
obtain diversity jurisdiction over the UM coverage dispute. Diversity
jurisdiction is premised upon the parties residing in different states and
requires that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.263 As previously
mentioned, the insured claimant and the insurance company are most likely
going to reside in the same state. But more importantly, the $75,000 amount
in controversy requirement is rarely going to be satisfied because UM policy
limits usually range from $12,500 to $50,000.2 64 Because the policy limits
prevent the claim from exceeding the $75,000 amount in controversy
requirement, federal courts will not have diversity jurisdiction to hear a UM
dispute and afford parties due process of law.
Thus, the probable lack of state action, the possible inapplicability of the
FAA, and the expected inability to satisfy the amount in controversy
requirement are obstacles to the establishment of judicial-like procedural
safeguards in UM arbitration. However, if the current UM dispute resolution
system continues to perpetuate improper insurance defense techniques, such
as dead air silence, then deserving insured claimants will be unable to receive
their legally entitled recovery-namely the UM policy limits. Therefore, if
the general public is to view UM arbitration with a semblance of legal
legitimacy and exercise a willingness to arbitrate disputes, then the structure
of UM disputes needs to be altered.
VI. A SOLUTION TO PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES IN UM ARBITRATION
Irrespective of the numerous obstacles to legally obtaining procedural
adequacy in UM arbitration, other avenues can provide preliminary solutions.
Although a completely fair arbitration is not legally required, an
improvement in the arbitral system is a first step toward a fairer process of
resolving UM disputes. The solution with the most potential is incorporating
a due process protocol specifically governing UM arbitration.
263 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2004) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between--(1) citizens of different states .... ").
264 This information is based on the author's experience as a summer clerk in the
corporate legal department of an insurance company.
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Due process protocols have been adopted with success in the
employment, consumer, and health care spheres, and could prove to be the
solution in improving the procedural safeguards for insured claimants.265
Implementing a similar due process protocol for UM arbitration will define
the standards and procedures to which arbitrators should conform, 266 instead
of allowing them to utilize their inordinate discretion. 267 Most importantly, a
due process protocol will give insured claimants the perception that they are
receiving the correct proportion of justice, and will also increase the public
confidence in arbitration as an effective dispute resolution system. Analyzing
the framework of due process protocols and the beneficial effects existing
protocols have had on arbitration, demonstrates that extending a due process
protocol specifically governing UM arbitration is a promising solution for
curing the effects of dead air silence while also combating the negative
characteristics associated with the current structure.
A. The Due Process Protocol Trend
In the past eight years, arbitration law has evolved to incorporate due
process protocols to govern the manner in which arbitrations are
conducted.268 This evolution is best illustrated by the creation of the
Employment Protocol, Health Care Protocol, and Consumer Protocol to
regulate the arbitration conducted in these respective fields.269 While the
three due process protocols differ in substantive ways, they all seek to ensure
a minimally fair process for parties by providing standards and procedures
for arbitrators to follow in managing arbitration. 270 These protocols were
developed by task forces and advisory committees of various groups
interested in the resolution of employment, health care, and consumer
issues.271 Infusing due process protections was thought to be essential if
arbitration was to act as a substitute, or a reasonable equivalent, for judicial
models.272 The protocols have thus far served two significant functions: (1)
265 See Harding, supra note 128, at 369 (explaining that due process protocols in all
three fields seek to ensure a minimally fair process for disputants by providing for
standards and procedures arbitrators are to follow when conducting arbitrations).
266 See id.
267 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
268 Harding, supra note 128, at 369.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 395.
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they inform the courts of the due process necessary in an arbitration process
to effectively vindicate a party's rights, and (2) they provide a standard to
judge certain arbitration practices and procedures. 273
Due process protocols in the employment, health care, and consumer
spheres serve numerous purposes. 274 First, the protocols reveal a clear
attempt to regulate the arbitration process by ensuring the perception and the
experience of fairness for the disputants.275 A second purpose of the
protocols is to establish standards to fill in the procedural gaps that the
Supreme Court has left open.276 Third, due process protocols seek to
preserve arbitration's reputation as a useful and effective alternative dispute
resolution process, especially for those individuals removed from the current
judicial system.277 The final purpose of the three due process protocols is to
level the procedural playing field for those claimants who are required to
resort to arbitration as a result of the "unilateral imposition of arbitration in a
contract of adhesion." 278
Because the Employment Protocol influenced the creation of closely
identical counterparts in the health care and consumer fields, the procedural
protections contained in the Employment Protocol reveal materially
significant principles of what process is due.279 The specific procedural
safeguards arbitrators must afford include: (1) providing reasonable
discovery, (2) defining issues to be arbitrated, (3) preserving order in the
hearing, (4) ruling accurately on evidentiary matters, (5) determining when
the hearing will close, (6) issuing an award that resolves the submitted
dispute, and (7) supplying the parties with a written opinion. 280 Members of
27 3 Id. at 412.
274 Nat'l Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Arbitration Act-2000, 3 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L. J. 323, 351 (describing the general purpose
of due process protocols is to ensure procedural and substantive fairness in arbitrations
where adherence with the articulated standards will make arbitration a legitimate
alternative to litigation).
275 Harding, supra note 128, at 416.
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 See id at 369.
2 8 0 Am. ARBITRATION ASS'N, DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIP § C.5 [hereinafter "EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL"], available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535. A pertinent portion of the due process protocol for
employment disputes is as follows:
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the task force felt due process safeguards should be encouraged to protect
individuals (as opposed to corporate defendants) who do not have effective
access to judicial relief.28 1 As a result, each provision should be interpreted
under the protocol's principal focus, which is promoting "standards of
exemplary due process." 282 More importantly, arbitrators "must be
independent of bias toward either party" and should refrain from imposing
procedures that lack requisite due process. 283 Finally, an arbitrator's award
that complies with the due process requirements contained in the protocol
will be final and binding and the scope of review will be limited.284
Similar to the Employment Due Process Protocol, its consumer
counterpart was created in response to fairness concerns regarding conflict
resolution mechanisms under the boilerplate language of take-it-or-leave-it
contracts. 285 The stated mission of the Consumer Protocol's Advisory
Committee is to develop minimum standards and procedures for the
The arbitrator should be bound by applicable agreements, statutes, regulations
and rules of procedure of the designating agency, including the authority to
determine the time and place of the hearing, permit reasonable discovery, issue
subpoenas, decide arbitrability issues, preserve order and privacy in the hearings,
rule on evidentiary matters, determine the close of the hearing and procedures for
post-hearing submissions, and issue an award resolving the submitted dispute.
The arbitrator should be empowered to award whatever relief would be
available in court under the law. The arbitrator should issue an opinion and award
setting forth a summary of the issues, including the type(s) of dispute(s), the
damages and/or other relief requested and awarded, a statement of any other issues
resolved, and a statement regarding the disposition of any statutory claim(s).
EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL § C.5.
281 Id. at Genesis ("[A]rbitration of statutory disputes conducted under proper due
process safeguards should be encouraged in order to provide expeditious, accessible,
inexpensive and fair private enforcement of statutory employment disputes for the
100,000,000 members of the workforce who might not otherwise have ready, effective
access to administrative or judicial relief.").
282 Id. § A ("The focus of this protocol is on standards of exemplary due process").
283 Id. § C. 1.
284 Id. § D. Because due process is afforded to the parties, there is no need to access
the courts. Therefore, an arbitral award that is final and binding when rendered in a
proceeding with due process does not deprive a party of receiving an equitable proportion
of justice.
285 AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL [hereinafter
"CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL"], Introduction: Genesis of the Advisory
Committee, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019.
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equitable resolution of consumer disputes, and thereby attempt to enhance
consumers' reasonable expectation of fairness.286
Specifically, the Consumer Protocol entitles all parties to a
fundamentally fair dispute resolution process, a principle that should be
observed in structuring alternative dispute resolution (ADR) programs. 287
Furthermore, consumers must be given full and accurate information about
the arbitration provision at the time the consumer contracts for goods or
services. 28 8 This includes notice of the arbitration clause, an explanation of
the consequences of arbitrating rather than litigating a dispute, whether the
clause is mandatory, and the distinctions between arbitration and court
proceedings. 289 Therefore, the Consumer Protocol provides useful guidance
in how agreements to arbitrate increase their legitimacy and work toward
providing a "fundamentally-fair ADR process." 290 In addition to a claimant's
procedural rights being improved, the beneficial effects of existing protocols
demonstrate the need for a due process protocol to govern UM arbitration.
B. Effects of the Due Process Protocols and the Probable Impact on
UMArbitration
Implementing a due process protocol for UM arbitration would only
present viable solutions if the beneficial effects in the employment, health
care, and consumer fields are established. The Employment Protocol has
assured employers some measure of fairness and due process to employer-
promulgated schemes to arbitrate disputes. 291 Due process protocols have
been described as having a "tremendous impact" on arbitration because
major arbitration service providers (such as the American Arbitration
Association) have agreed to follow the protocols and draft rules consistent
286 See id.
287 Id. at Principle 1: Fundamentally-Fair Process ("All parties are entitled to a
fundamentally-fair ADR process. As embodiments of fundamental fairness, these
Principles should be observed in structuring ADR Programs.").
288 Id. at Principle 2: Access to Information Regarding ADR Program ("Providers of
goods or services should undertake reasonable measures to provide Consumers with full
and accurate information regarding Consumer ADR Programs, at the time the Consumer
contracts for goods or services.").
2 89 Id. at Principle 11: Agreements to Arbitrate (stating that consumers must be
given "clear and adequate notice of the arbitration provision and its consequences,
including a statement of its mandatory or optional character.. . including basic
distinctions between arbitration and court proceedings").
290 Id. at Principle 1: Fundamentally-Fair Process.
291 Harding, supra note 128, at 369.
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with the principles of the protocols in conducting arbitration.292 Additionally,
implementing the protocols has resulted in a self-regulatory effort by the
arbitration industry to infuse due process protections, which invariably
promotes the use of ADR for settling certain disputes.293
Furthermore, the incorporation of due process protocols has enhanced
arbitration's reputation as an effective dispute resolution mechanism.294 The
recent commitment to ensure that due process protection is provided has
helped legitimize the growing use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
adhesion contracts.295 Moreover, the due process protocols have also
effectively fended off more direct government regulation of the arbitration
industry and have maintained the Supreme Court's national policy favoring
arbitration. 296 Most importantly, the arbitration industry's agreement to abide
by a due process protocol has prevented the drafters of pre-dispute clauses
from gaining an unfair advantage in the arbitral process.297 This means that
corporate and institutional defendants can no longer express restrictions in
how the arbitration is to proceed because the due process protocol will
generally govern those matters.
In addition, an arbitrator's discretion in managing the hearing is limited
because the due process protocol establishes the requisite procedural
safeguards to be included in arbitration. 298 The repeat player problem is also
solved with implementation of due process protocols because arbitrators are
required to disclose any circumstances likely to compromise impartiality,
such as financial interest that might affect the result of the proceeding.299 As
2 9 2 Id. at 369-70.
2 9 3 Id. at 370-71.
294 Id. at 371.
2 9 5 Id.
296 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (citation
omitted) (holding that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard
for the federal policy favoring arbitration"); Harding, supra note 128, at 371 (arguing that
the favored status of arbitration is in reference to the Gilmer decision where the Supreme
Court articulated a national policy favoring arbitration as an adequate method in
resolving disputes among private parties). The author suggests that due process protocols
have maintained this favored status because of the procedural safeguards implemented in
arbitration. Id. Infusing procedural safeguards have resulted in a perception of fairness
associated with arbitrating disputes, and thereby continually sustains the Supreme Court's
national policy favoring arbitration. See id.
297 Harding, supra note 128, at 401.
298 EMPLOYMENT DuE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 280, § C.5.
2 99 Id. § C.4 (arbitrators have a "duty to disclose any relationships which might
reasonably constitute or be perceived as a conflict of interest"); CONSUMER DUE PROCESS
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a result, the due process protocol has legitimized arbitration as a preferred
method of dispute resolution, has eliminated the unfair advantage corporate
defendants possessed, and has eradicated the fear of not knowing how
arbitrators will utilize their discretion in conducting the proceeding.
The impact of the due process protocol has also extended into the judicial
forum. In one case, the Federal District Court of South Carolina held that an
arbitration agreement, which was widely found by experts to be contrary to
the Employment Protocol, 300 was void for being unconscionable and a
violation of public policy.3 0' The standards set forth in the Employment
Protocol provide courts with guidance in determining the appropriate rules
for conducting arbitration. 30 2 Because the arbitration rules in the South
Carolina case did not comply with those standards, this is arguably a factor
that led the court to invalidate the agreement to arbitrate disputes. 30 3
Therefore, non-compliance with due process principles outlined in the
various protocols can lead courts to invalidate both the arbitration agreement
and the subsequent award.
UM arbitration should follow the general trend of adopting a due process
protocol to assure parties of procedural safeguards and maintain fairness in
the arbitral forum. By creating a due process protocol similar to the
employment version, the procedural playing field between the insured
claimant and the insurance company will be leveled. This means that the
protocol will have predetermined UM arbitration procedures and standards,
instead of being deferred to the unfettered discretion of potentially conflicted
arbitrators. Additionally, providing due process safeguards eliminates the
concern that mandating arbitration of UM disputes will displace the
judiciary. Under an employment-like protocol, insured claimants seeking
PROTOCOL, supra note 285, at Principle 3.5 (arbitrators have a duty to disclose "any
circumstance likely to affect impartiality, including any bias or financial or personal
interest which might affect the result of the ADR proceeding"); Leader & Burger, supra
note 155, at 116 (arguing that implementing due process protocols along with the
disclosure obligations for arbitrators diminishes the repeat player effect).
300 Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 600-01 (D.S.C. 1998).
301 See generally id. at 614 (denying the motion to compel arbitration because the
existence of multiple one-sided provisions exclusively favoring the employer results in
the invalidation of the arbitration agreement for being unconscionable and violating
public policy). Even though the court did not specifically invalidate the arbitration
agreement for deviating from the Employment Protocol, the protocol's standards
provided a "benchmark" for the court to determine appropriate arbitration rules. Harding,
supra note 128, at 410-11.
302 Harding, supra note 128, at 410-11 & n.242.
303 See id. at 410-11.
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UM coverage will have the opportunity for discovery, immediate decisions
on evidentiary matters, and relief that is available in courts.304 Moreover,
incorporating a consumer-like protocol provision that gives individuals clear
notice of the arbitration provision will bring greater awareness to the nature
and manner of resolving future disputes. 305 As a result, the controversial
characteristics of mandatory arbitration clauses will be diminished because
UM arbitration governed under a due process protocol will afford insured
claimants protections comparable to judicial action. But as an added
protection, a UM due process protocol that is similar to the Employment
Protocol will not allow the insureds to waive their right to judicial relief
arising out of the contractual relationship with the insurer for any reason.30 6
Thus, insured claimants have the benefit of obtaining a court-like proceeding
in a more expeditious arbitral forum, while still retaining the right to have a
court resolve the dispute.
Perhaps of greater significance is how implementation of a due process
protocol can prevent insurance defense lawyers from using dead air silence to
reduce or nullify a company's UM coverage obligation. According to the
Employment Protocol, each provision is to be interpreted under standards of
"exemplary due process."307 Thus, an arbitrator will be obligated to protect
the insured claimant from the intentional use of dead air.30 8 Witnessing the
effects the dead air tension undeniably causes the insured claimant will
require the arbitrator to sustain objections raised by the insured's counsel and
assure that "exemplary due process" has been provided. The resulting
outcome is that the insureds will not be susceptible to creating
inconsistencies in their testimony, and therefore will be more likely to
receive an arbitral award that accurately compensates them for the damages
that were incurred. Furthermore, an arbitrator is required to provide an
expeditious hearing.30 9 Using dead air silence consumes valuable time and
304 EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 280, § C.5.
305 See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 285, at Principle 2: Access
to Information Regarding ADR Program, Principle 11: Agreement to Arbitrate.
3 0 6 See EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 280, § A ("employees
should not be permitted to waive their right to judicial relief... for any reason."); see
also CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 285, at Principle 1: Fundamentally-
Fair ADR Process ("All parties are entitled to a fundamentally-fair ADR process.").
307 EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 280, § A.
308 See id.
309 Id. at Genesis.
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detracts from the purpose of providing an expeditious hearing.310 Due
process protocols supply arbitrators with another avenue to prevent the
insurer's intentional use of dead air silence. Therefore, implementing a due
process protocol that specifically governs UM arbitration not only creates
fairness in the arbitral forum, but also thwarts the use of unfair tactics such as
dead air silence.
A due process protocol for UM arbitration can alleviate many of the
procedural deficiencies found in the current dispute resolution system. To
ensure the maximum benefits of such a protocol, a provision should be
included noting that a violation of the UM Due Process Protocol will result in
the reviewing court vacating the arbitration award on judicial review.311
Thus, in order for arbitrators' awards to be preserved, they must conduct
arbitration in accordance with standards of due of process. As a result,
adopting a UM due process protocol enables an insured claimant to receive
procedural safeguards comparable to a judicial proceeding, and thereby
retain a sense of fairness in the result and confidence in arbitration as an
effective dispute resolution mechanism.
VII. CONCLUSION
While UM coverage disputes resolved through arbitration are almost
always mandatory, 312 the process does not have to deprive parties of fairness.
Under the current structure of UM arbitration; there are many aspects that
would appear to outsiders to be one-sided and against the insured individual,
as well as violative of procedural due process rights. Just one example of the
inequities in UM arbitration is the insurer's use of dead air to damage the
credibility of the insured before the eyes of the arbitrator, who will most
likely take this into consideration when issuing the binding arbitral award.
The combination of arbitrators using unfettered discretion to manage the UM
arbitration process and subconsciously skewing the procedures in favor of
the repeat insurance player perpetuates the intentional use of dead air.
Whether dead air silence is used by all insurance companies or in all regions
is irrelevant. The fact that the UM arbitration structure allows the tactic to be
used illustrates the unfairness associated with the process and the need for a
change.
310 See id. (stating how due process safeguards should be employed to encourage a
proceeding that is expeditious, accessible, inexpensive, and fair).
311 See Leader & Burger, supra note 155, at 124.
312 THE AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, supra note 22, at 104.
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Implementing a due process protocol specifically governing UM
arbitration would ensure that the letter and spirit of UM arbitration comports
with procedural due process. Similar protocols have been adopted recently in
the employment, health care, and consumer industries with successful
results;313 and it would make sense for the large automotive insurance
industry to conform to the trend of introducing due process protections in
UM arbitration. Even though adoption of the UM Protocol may not solve all
procedural deficiencies found in the current structure of arbitration, it is a
first step toward an improved system. As such, incremental gains can result
in the insured receiving a greater proportion of justice, the public increasing
its confidence in recovering UM benefits, and arbitration enhancing its
semblance of legal legitimacy. The "big bad" insurance companies need not
perpetuate their traditional negative image. A good starting point for
furthering this objective is to improve the resolution of UM coverage
disputes.
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313 See Harding, supra note 128, at 369 (stating that "[t]he protocols have had a
tremendous impact on arbitration").
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